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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation sets out as a challenge to two trends in the 
analysis of the trade union movement. The first trend implies 
that there is no fundamental difference in political strategy 
between the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions ( COSATU ) which was 
formed in 1985 and included amongst others all the FOSATU 
affiliates. Swilling for instance writes that the unions 
established in the 1970s "shunned distinctions between economic 
and political issues and stridently challenged state policies" 
(Swilling, 1987: 2). Maree too implies that the involvement of
the industrial unions in community and political struggles in the 
mid-1980s was not incompatible with their earlier position (1987: 
1 0 ) .
The second trend argues that there has been a shift away from 
"independence" to an alliance or "subordination" of the trade 
union movement to the national liberation movement, and greets 
this with varying degrees of dismay or confusion (Plaut, 1987; 
Friedman, 1987; Browne, 1987; Innes, 1986).
It seems to me indisputable that there has been a profound shift 
in the politics of the labour movement, marked by the different 
public positions of FOSATU and COSATU. One only has to compare 
papers produced by former FOSATU officials (Forster, 1982; Erwin,
1985) or FOSATU Worker News, with the speeches of COSATU 
officials (Naidoo, 1986a and 1986b; Mafumadi, 1986; Ramaphosa,
1986) for this to be clear.
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On the basis of the assumption that a fundamental shift has 
occurred, this dissertation then sets out to explore three 
questions.
The first question is: how did this change occur? What was the 
role played by rank and file membership, by shopfloor leadership, 
and by union leadership in this process? What bearing did the 
formation of UDF in 1983, and the escalation of popular struggles 
in 1984/5 have on it? How was it that one federation, claiming to 
be democratic and thus expressing the will of the workers, could 
align itself with the liberation movement, whereas three years 
previously its major predecessors, also claiming to be democratic 
and thus to express the will of the workers, would have very 
little to with the UDF?
My case study of a group of worker leaders in Springs, conducted 
through interviews, is an attempt to explore some of these 
questions . Since their experience forms only one uniquely 
coloured piece in the mosaic of national experiences in the first 
half of the 1980s, the case study can in no way pretend to 
definitively answer these questions. Moreover, the case study is 
itself incomplete, since there are a number of events that still 
need to be clarified through further discussions with the workers 
and others, and also because the interviewees by and large belong 
to one political tendency in Springs. There were others, and 
their leaders have still to be interviewed.
My second aim was to explore a range of theoretical problems in 
Marxism, with the purpose of trying to establish a theoretical 
framework that could explain why the political shift happened, 
why the present leadership of COSATU, with a Congress political 
position, came to dominate the union movement.
To this end I discuss various Marxist theories of contradiction 
in society, and more specifically, Marxist theories of politics.
The third aim of the dissertation, closely linked to the second, 
was to develop a coherent theoretical critique of and answer to 
those who express dismay at the betrayal of working class 
interests by their subsumption into African nationalism; to 
provide in a sense a theoretical foundation to the strategies
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chosen by the workers in Springs. This too involves a discussion 
of political theory, and particularly of the national question'. 
Essentially, it involves an attempt to explain the relation of 
class to national struggle.
Implicit in these discussions is the question whether Marxism 
could analyse and grasp all these processes, or whether Marxism 
is inherently class reductionist and becomes incoherent once it 
attempts to grasp the specificity of the political terrain.
This dissertation, then, takes the following course:
Chapter 1 is the introduction, with a note on methodology.
Chapter 2 analyses the material context of the case study. It 
describes the origins and growth of FOSATU, the changes in the 
labour process that laid the conditions for the emergence of mass 
based industrial unionism in the 1970s and 80s, as well as the 
historical development of Springs. I try to analyse some of the 
factors that make Springs a distinctive industrial town, and that 
could explain the political developments there.
Chapter 3 is a composition built out of my interview material. It 
is the story of the experiences and struggles of workers in 
Springs, both within their community and in the wider 
organisation of FOSATU, as seen by leading worker activists 
themselves. It is therefore, not a statement of truth, or of 
what happened, but rather, the story of how important 
participants in a series of struggles now interpret them.
Chapter 4 is a theoretical critique of three position papers that 
emerged within FOSATU and its tradition. This critique draws on 
some of the ideas and strategies of worker leaders recorded in 
Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 moves on to an extended discussion of theoretical 
problems in Marxism, and ends with an attempt to theorise the 
'national question'. This chapter aims to develop a Marxist 
position that can analyse and grasp the experiences and 
strategies of the interviewees. It also aims to provide a 
coherent theoretical foundation for the political position and
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strategies that characterise COSATU.
Chapter 6 is a brief conclusion which attempts to tie all the 
strands of exploration together.
1.2 METHODOLOGY
The only research method used in this study was to interview 
participants. The following were interviewed:
Zakes - former SFAWU shop steward in Springs, and former senior 
office-bearer of FOSATU. A talk given at a FAWU seminar (1987a); 
an interview (1987b); a discussion of my draft write-up of the 
interviews, ie. a draft of Chapter 3 (1987c).
Vincint, George and David - three shop stewards at Packers, a key 
SFAWU factory in Springs. Interviewed as a group (Packers shop 
stewards, 1987).
Vincint - as above, interviewed alone (1987).
Moses - former SFAWU official in the Transvaal branch. Lives in 
Soweto (1987).
Mzwakhe - former MAWU office-bearer and then official; then 
UMMAWOSA official. Moved to Springs in 1983. One interview 
(1987); one discussion of draft of Chapter 3 (1987b).
Robert - former MAWU shop steward at Raleigh cycles; then member 
of Amalova; then full-time organiser for Amalova. Two interviews 
( 1987a and 1987b).
Nomathemba - organiser for PWAWU in Springs from 1981-3. Lived in 
Tsakane ( 1987) .
Alec Erwin - general secretary of FOSATU 1979-82; then education 
secretary of FOSATU; education secretary of COSATU (1987).
Human Resources Manager at Packers (1987).
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Most of the names used are pseudonyms, as is the name of the 
factory, Packers.
I also attended one general meeting of Amalova in KwaThema.
The interview methodology provides insights into the perceptions 
and interpretations of the participants, and gives one access to 
the strategic debates that take place (see Lambert 1987b).
It does have a number of limitations as far as accuracy is 
concerned, though. Firstly, interviewees are interpreting the 
past from the vantage point of the present. They will attempt to 
make the past coherent and consistent with their present 
viewpoints.
Secondly, in this case study, the interviewees are all comrades 
who have shared the same experiences and continue to discuss and 
interpret both the past and the present together. As a result, 
they will present a fairly coherent picture with few 
contradictions or discrepancies.
Thirdly, the interviewer himself has a great but unmeasurable 
impact on the evidence. The attitude of the interviewees to him 
or her, the questions he/she asks, which slices of the interview 
are regarded as important and are thus quoted - all of these will 
shape the kind of evidence that is 'discovered' through 
interviews.
For the most insightful use of interviews it is best to cross­
check them against other interviews with participants who have 
different views and different experiences, and against other 
kinds of historical records. I was, however, unable to do this 
because of lack of time. This has to be considered, then, as an 
unfinished piece of research, or as work in progress.
I believe that the people whose experiences one is researching 
have some right to participate in interpreting the material. 
Accordingly, when I first met each interviewee T explained that I 
would come back with a rough draft of the material I had written 
up, for their further comment. I was unfortunately not able to 
follow this process through to its conclusion - a further reason
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why this is to be regarded as an unfinished project. I was able 
to meet with two interviewees after they had read my draft 
(Zakes, 1987c and Mzwakhe 1987b). The discussions were extremely 
interesting, and opened up new questions, new events, and further 
qualifications of the views expressed in the first set of 
interviews. I have not had time to incorporate these discussions 
fully in the dissertation. Mzwakhe proposed that all the 
interviewees meet as a group with me to discuss discrepancies and 
interpretations. This will be a very exciting way of taking the 
project forward and deepening its analysis.
Such a process of active dialogue between researcher and objects 
of that research has been proposed by Touraine. He argues that, 
for the investigator who is trying to understand a social 
movement there appear to be two options:
On the one hand we might listen to individuals, on the other 
to an organisation, ie on the one hand we could hear reasons 
for participating individually in a movement, and on the 
other we could hear the political, strategic and tactical 
form given to the movement. But between these two, the 
movement itself would be missing... (quoted in Sitas, 1983:
9 )
In order to grasp the movement Touraine suggests "a) that the 
nature of social movements is most fully revealed in the 
experiences, conflicts and struggles of the smaller 'molecular' 
groups which comprise it; b) that these 'molecular' groups must 
be understood through a process of group self-analysis in which 
the sociologist plays an active part." (Sitas, 1983: 9).
These are extremely suggestive ideas. The group of trade union 
activists interviewed for this study do form such a molecular 
group, and my approach has entailed, or begun to entail, a form 
of group self-analysis. I feel, however, that I do not yet fully 
understand the methodological implications of my approach, nor 
what the authentic relationship between an academic investigator 
and the activists whose struggles he/she is investigating ought 
to be. Once again, I can only plead that this is an unfinished 
project.
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In the end, then, it has to be stressed that in my case study I 
am telling a story based on the stories told to me by a group of 
worker activists, who share a common political position, about 
their experiences and struggles.
One challenge is to distill, to recognise the edges of our 
stories and of the stories being told to us from the past, 
and to work towards comprehending the forces and processes 
through which both develop and at times are enravelled 
(Cohen, 1986: 22 ) .
This study comprises one tentative step towards this goal. The 
full story has not yet been told - it will have to contain many 
other stories that are as yet untold.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CONTEXT OF THE CASE STUDY
The growth of FOSATU 
The development of Springs
2.1 THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS (FOSATU)
FOSATU was formed in 1979 as a national federation of industrial 
trade unions, with a paid up membership of 18 000 and a claimed 
membership of 37 000 (Maree, 1987: 3, 8). At its formation FOSATU 
had affiliates in the metal, motor, textile, chemical, food, 
glass, paper/wood, and transport and general industrial sectors.
The unions that formed FOSATU had a variety of origins. The Metal 
and Allied Workers Union (MAWU), National Union of Textile 
Workers (NUTW), Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) and 
Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU) had been affiliated 
to the Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating Council (TUACC) 
which had started in 1973 in Natal and was closely associated 
with the Industrial Aid Society (IAS) in Transvaal. The TUACC and 
IAS trade unions were organised with the help of white university 
students, sympathetic TUCSA (the non-militant, predominantly 
white Trade Union Council of South Africa) officials, and former 
SACTU members . These unions formed the core of the new 
federation, and it was essentially built on their principles of 
workers control and a tight federation (Bonner, 1979: 13, 14).
Another group of unions in the Transvaal, initiated by the Urban 
Training Project and falling under the umbrella of the Co­
ordinating Council of Black Trade Unions (CCOBTU) was part of the 
talks that led up to the formation of FOSATU, but withdrew out
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of discomfort with the idea of worker involvement in the talks, 
with the principle of worker control, and with the presence of 
whites in the federation (Bonner, 1979: 15). However, two CCOBTU 
affiliates, the Glass and Allied Workers Union (GAWU - later to 
merge with CWIU) , and the Paper Wood and Allied Workers Union 
(PWAWU) broke away and participated in FOSATU's formation. The 
executive of the Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU) 
broke with their officials and also joined the new federation 
(the CCOBTU was later to form another federation, the Council of 
Unions of South Africa (CUSA)).
The other important founding affiliates of FOSATU were the three 
motor unions that broke away from TUCSA to join the emerging 
democratic trade unions. They combined to form the National 
Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU).
FOSATU had four key policy principles. Firstly, it was non- 
racial, believing in "the maximum unity of workers at the 
workplace". The principle of non-racialism distinguished FOSATU 
from the CCOBTU unions, which had a policy of black leadership..
Secondly, FOSATU held the principle of worker control. This meant 
that there was a "majority of worker representatives at all 
policy making levels" of the federation. "Those workers must be 
the authentic representatives of organised factory groups who 
have the capacity to report back and be controlled by the workers 
they represent." (Bonner, 1979: 22) As an example, the Branch 
Executive Committees (BECs) of FOSATU affiliates were composed of 
representatives elected by the shop steward committees in each 
factory; thus they were directly accountable to their factory 
base, rather than being elected at a general meeting of all union 
members, as was the case with CCOBTU executives (Maree, 1987: 6).
Thirdly, the affiliates of FOSATU were to be industrial unions.
Fourthly, FOSATU was a tight federation. According to TUACC this 
meant, "The principle of co-operating is not one of basically 
independent bodies co-operating with each other as and when they 
feel like it. Rather the principle is one of the unions pooling 
their resources and placing them under the control of the 
federation. In this way membership of the federation gives one
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access to the pooled resources... and the costs of withdrawal are 
higher." (Bonner, 1979: 14) In addition, FOSATU would 
"selectively grant admission so ensuring a high degree of policy 
consensus among the affiliates", and policy decisions by regional 
councils would be binding on affiliates (ibid: 23).
The structures and policies of the FOSATU unions helped to 
sustain the most solid and consistent growth of all the emerging 
democratic unions. FOSATU had a paid-up membership of 118 950 in 
early 1985 (SA Review 3: 99). Several of its affiliates had a 
national industrial presence. By 1983 FOSATU affiliates had 
signed 285 recognition agreements, which was 70% of the total 
number. They had also engaged in a range of industrial struggles 
over wages, retrenchments, dismissals, health and safety and 
other issues. Together with the other democratic trade unions 
FOSATU had made significant inroads into management's unilateral 
right to control the workplace.
But FOSATU's growth was not just quantitative. It is generally 
acknowledged that the non-racial industrial unions, ie FOSATU, 
Food and Canning Workers Union, and the General Workers Union had 
the best and most consistently organised workplaces. Since their 
structures were based on shop steward committees elected at each 
workplace, the growth of these trade unions entailed the growth 
of a cadre of disciplined worker leaders. In 1983 there were 
about 6000 shop stewards in democratic trade union structures. By 
1985 the figure for 70% of the democratic trade unions stood at 
12 462 shop stewards (Maree, 1987: 9). These worker leaders were 
increasingly able to control and lead their trade unions, as well 
as begin to take an active part in community organisations beyond 
the factory gates.
In the early 1980s the militant layer of shopfloor leaders in 
FOSATU spearheaded a new form of working class organisation, most 
notably on the East Rand - the Shop Steward Councils (SSCs). 
Initially aiming to organise and consolidate new factories, and 
co-ordinate the rolling strike waves of 1981 and 1982 on the Near 
East Rand in the face of a chronic shortage of union organisers, 
some of the SSCs began to take up community issues (Baskin, 1982; 
Swilling, 1983; Maree, 1987: 9-10). That process is, in part, the 
subject of this dissertation.
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Generally speaking, FOSATU unions tended to avoid participation 
in community struggles, or any form of alliance with other 
organisations. They were marked by a profound distrust of popular 
politics, which they termed 'populist', and of the dominant 
political tradition within popular politics, represented by the 
exiled ANC and SACTU, and later by the UDF. This particular 
attitude and practice, which is best described as 'workerism', is 
analysed in much greater depth in the body of this dissertation.
The workerism of FOSATU and some of the other industrial unions 
was sharply criticised by a group of general unions that rose to 
prominence in the early 1980s - the South African Allied Workers 
Union (SAAWU) and the General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU) 
being the most important. Their fiery and charismatic leadership 
argued that trade unions had to participate in community 
struggles since workers were part of the community. The working 
class had to engage in alliances as a component of the national 
democratic struggle. When the United Democratic Front was 
launched in 1983 as a front of civic, youth, women's, church, 
political and other organisations, most of these political trade 
unions affiliated too. FOSATU, GWU and FCWU greeted the new 
political body with at best lukewarm enthusiasm, and decided not 
to affiliate.
Whatever the political merits of the critique of the workerist 
unions by the UDF unions - and I shall argue it did have merit - 
it is incontestable that by the time COSATU was launched the 
workerist unions were bigger, more powerful and better organised 
at the workplace than the UDF unions. Although 14 of the unions 
present at the inaugural congress were UDF affiliates, they 
accounted for less than 20% of its membership (Maree, 1987: 11).
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the reasons 
for this slow growth of the UDF unions, it may be taken to 
reflect an important tension in the relation of trade union 
organisation to politics. Trade unions have limited resources and 
person-power. Generally, the more time spent by the union 
leadership on political activities, the less time there is 
available for strengthening and extending organisation on the 
shopfloor. Thus it appears that the UDF unions tended to neglect
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One must be careful, however, not to see political and trade 
union activity as inherently mutually exclusive: Lambert argues 
that during the 1950s some regions of SACTU were strengthened by 
their alliance with the ANC (Lambert, 1985: 270), and the rapid 
increase in membership of COSATU affiliates since the formation 
of the new federation also suggests that its political profile 
has increased its appeal to workers.
None the less, despite the political critique of workerism by the 
UDF unions, and despite the fact that COSATU has adopted a 
political policy fundamentally different from that of FOSATU, it 
is the organisational strength of FOSATU which has provided the 
foundation of COSATU's strength, and its ability to withstand two 
States of Emergency and in fact grow through them. It was the 
painstaking organisational efforts of FOSATU and similar trade 
unions that constituted the working class as a powerful social 
force able to play a significant political role. This shopfloor 
strength, inherited in large part from FOSATU, has not only 
enabled COSATU to withstand state repression, but has also 
increased the power and gravitational attraction of the trade 
unions and the working class within the national democratic class 
alliance, probably one of the key factors in placing the issue of 
social transformation at the centre of the agenda for resistance 
politics. The importance of this heritage from FOSATU and other 
workerist unions is well-recognised by COSATU's present 
leadership:
COSATU is first and foremost a trade union federation... Its 
roots are on the factory floor. Its starting point is its 
organisational strength at the point of production...
Our political and economic strength lies in building 
powerful, militant, democratic organisation in the 
workplace. This strength will guarantee that workers' 
aspirations will not be suppressed. Such organisation is 
also the basis for the real democratisation of production 
(Naidoo, quoted in Maree, 1987: 19).
consolidating their organisational base in the factories.
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The material basis for the new trade unions
Innes (1983) shows how the shift towards monopoly capitalism in 
manufacturing created new conditions for the trade union 
organisation of the working class. "Small factories employing 10- 
20 workers have given way to factories employing hundreds and 
often (in heavy engineering for instance) 2000 - 3000 workers 
under a single roof." "This concentration of workers at the point 
of production provides a material basis for the unity and 
organisation of the workers on a mass scale in production 
itself.” (ibid: 181)
At the same time monopoly capitalism has ushered in a change in 
the labour process. The increasing mechanisation and automation 
of the labour process that accompanies the shift to large scale 
production "opens up the need for a massive layer of semi-skilled 
workers" which has been recruited from the black working class. 
This has increased the strategic power of black workers, both in 
their ability to bring production to a standstill, and in the 
difficulty of replacing them (ibid: 182).
It is these developments in production that created the 
conditions for the emergence of powerful, mass-based industrial 
unions in the 1970s and 1980s.
2.2 SPRINGS: ITS INDUSTRY AND ITS AFRICAN TOWNSHIP
Springs developed in the last years of the last century as a 
mining camp located around a number of very profitable coal 
mines. In the first decade of the twentieth century a number of 
gold mines were opened up. Some of these were extremely 
profitable, and during the 1940s Springs mines were producing 25% 
of South Africa's gold output (Gilfoyle, 1983: 5).
However, during the 1940s and 1950s the local commercial 
bourgeoisie, aware of the limited life of the gold mines, 
pressurised the Town Council to find ways to expand the 
industrial base of the town. Accordingly the industrial areas of 
Nuffield and New Era were laid out, infrastructure built, and a 
publicity campaign financed (ibid, 11—13). This process mirrored
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that in a number of other East Rand towns, for example Benoni and 
Germiston.
This strategy met with considerable success. By 1950 there were 
77 manufacturing industries in Springs, and by 1960 there were 
116. These new industries were financed by national or 
international rather than local capital, produced for the 
national market, and were bigger producers employing larger 
workforces (ibid: 13). A "considerable number of food processing 
plants" were established because of the position of Springs 
between the towns of the East Rand and agricultural areas of the 
Eastern Transvaal" (ibid: 14). The growth of manufacturing in 
Springs continued. By 1970 there were 187 enterprises, by 1976 
there were 203 employing 18 647 black workers (Swilling, 1983: 
49) .
Many of these factories were owned by large multinational 
companies (Kelloggs, Gillettes, Fagersta Steel) or by South 
African monopoly capital (Boart Hard Metals, Pilkington's, SAPPI, 
Telephone Manufacturers of South Africa, Mondi, I&J, Impala 
Platinum Refineries, Ringrollers, Jabula Foods, Funa Foods).
By the mid-1980s the industries of Springs were producing a gross 
output of R2200 mil. p.a., accounting for 10% of the total output 
for the Witwatersrand (Springs Chamber of Commerce, telephone 
interview, 1987).
The African township which services Springs, KwaThema, was 
developed in the early 1950s as a model township to which 
Africans were resettled from the slums of Payneville. It was 
hoped that KwaThema would provide for the reproduction of a 
contented healthy working class appropriate to the needs of the 
modern industries which were being wooed to the industrial sites 
of Springs. The Chamber of Commerce could claim:
Some 4 0 000 Bantu have been housed in KwaThema, which is 
regarded as a model Bantu township, with a civic hall, 
churches, large sports stadium, playing fields and parks 
where the children can play in safety (Gilfoyle, 1983: 69).
Again, the building of model townships was not unique to Springs:
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Katlehong, the township outside Germiston, was also considered to 
be a model township. By 1960, 57 000 people were living in 
KwaThema.
I have tried very briefly to describe the industrial growth of 
Springs. Many of the industries established in the town are owned 
by monopoly capital, and exhibit those characteristics described 
by Innes as do those of the other industrial centres on the East 
Rand. This industrial base provided the conditions for the 
development of militant mass industrial unionism on the East Rand 
in the 1970s and 1980s.
It must be stressed, however, that Springs is still a relatively 
small town. It is the fourth biggest industrial centre on the 
East Rand, with the third biggest African industrial workforce, 
as the following tables show. It has a quarter the number of 
manufacturing concerns of Germiston, with a third of the number 
of African workers.
Total number of manufacturing establishments per magisterial 
district
1970 1976
Germiston 557 832
Boksburg 161 266
Benoni 176 209
Brakpan 80 104
Springs 174 203
Total number of African workers per magisterial district in 1976
Germiston 48 627
Boksburg 31 064
Benoni 16 999
Brakpan 3 121
Springs 28 645
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To sum up: Springs is relatively small in terms of its 
industrialisation and its black population. None the less, it is 
characterised by large scale monopoly industry. It has one 
township which provides labour to two industrial areas. It seems 
to have a relatively smaller proportion of heavy engineering than 
Germiston, with a higher proportion of light manufacturing and 
food processing (Mzwakhe, 1987b; Sitas, 1983: 5a).
These factors are important in contextualising the views and 
experiences of the workers discussed in the next chapter. In the 
first place, the smaller size of Springs, and the close relation 
between township and industrial area, facilitated an early 
involvement of organised workers in community struggles and 
organisation, since organised workers could easily become the 
leading force in the community. The industrial areas of 
Germiston, in contrast, attract workers from a wider spread of 
townships (Erwin, 1987). Other parts of the East Rand exhibit a 
similar lack of correspondence between residential and industrial 
areas.
Secondly, the high proportion of food processing in Springs made 
Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU), of which most of my 
interviewees are members, relatively more prominent than it was 
in other locals (none the less, there are still more organised 
metal and engineering factories in Springs (70 plus) than 
organised food factories (about 12)). The other locals tended to 
be dominated by MAWU (Erwin, 1987).
As the next chapter shows, a tension came to develop in FOSATU 
between SFAWU and the workerist trend which was dominant in 
FOSATU. At times this came to focus on differences between SFAWU 
and MAWU, with MAWU arguing for "caution" as far as entering into 
community struggles or alliances with community organisations was 
concerned (Erwin, 1987), and arguing that SFAWU was small, that 
in the Transvaal its base was on the East Rand and Johannesburg, 
whereas MAWU had organisation that spanned the province. This was 
the fruit of painstaking organisation on the shopfloor, MAWU 
argued, an approach which the SFAWU militants from Springs would 
do well to emulate (ibid). By early 1985 MAWU had 34 000 members 
while SFAWU had 12 000 (SA Review 3, 1985: 99-100)
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One factor that may have contributed to this difference of 
approach is the different structure of the sectors in which they 
organised. MAWU confronted a highly organised and intransigent 
body of employers, who often relied on extremely coercive 
management strategies to control the workforce in factories that 
were often labour-intensive. A large proportion, if not the 
majority, of metalworkers are migrant workers. There is therefore 
on average a low level of literacy and formal education in this 
sector.
Employers in the food sector were not highly organised. Factories 
were often capital-intensive, employing a more highly-skilled and 
highly-paid workforce. The Packers factory, for instance, where 
most of the interviews for this study were done, and which was 
one of the strongest bases both for SFAWU on the East Rand and 
for the Springs SSC, is a multi-national with a highly 
sophisticated "liberal" management. It has a capital value of 
roughly R3 million, and employs 350 people, of whom 250 are black 
workers (Human resources manager, Packers, 1987). The degree of 
capital intensity is shown by the fact that these 350 employees 
produce for 70% of the market in its product range.
Mzwakhe remarked that SFAWU shop stewards were noticeably more 
articulate with a higher level of formal education. This meant 
they would be more aware of what was going on, through reading 
newspapers, political journals and pamphlets (Mzwakhe, 1987b).
Thusa where MAWU was forced to build its strength in the industry 
as a whole before it could really alter conditions in individual 
factories, and where it had to fight the most militant battles in 
order simply to survive - where in short it was forced to 
concentrate all its energies on building and consolidating its 
factory base - SFAWU on the other hand was able to rely on a 
relatively secure factory base in individual factories, and 
engage in political struggles with less fear of dismissal (Erwin, 
1987) (It must be stressed that these points are tentatively 
made: more research is required in order to verify them).
It ought also to be pointed out that by early 1985 a much greater 
degree of consensus had emerged within FOSATU on how to approach 
the relation between unions and community organisation. Erwin
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referred to a national policy seminar at that time which provided 
an extremely fruitful forum for discussion between the different 
trends (Erwin, 1987). This consensus is practically demonstrated 
by the involvement of Moses Mayekiso, general secretary of MAWU, 
in the 1984 stayaway (he was the FOSATU representative on the co­
ordinating committee), and in organising the community of 
Alexandra (Erwin, 1987):
People were disorganised in Alexandra and they wanted to be 
united. There were meetings - little meetings - of residents 
discussing how to organise Alexandra. At the end of the day 
we held meetings street by street trying to hear how people 
wanted to organise Alexandra. People decided that they 
should form yard, block and street committees leading up to 
the Alexandra Action Committee. Most of these people were 
workers so the structures were based along the lines of 
trade union structures - accountability, elections every 
year and so on (Mayekiso, quoted in Maree, 1987: 20).
To return to Springs and SFAWU: the point that needs to be 
extracted from the foregoing analysis is that the case of 
Springs, and of SFAWU in Springs, is by no means typical of the 
experiences of FOSATU. Moreover, SFAWU was a relatively small 
union. These are points that must be born in mind, particularly 
in reading the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
WORKERS AND ORGANISATION IN SPRINGS
3.1 THE UNION AND THE SHOP STEWARD COUNCIL. (SSC)
Three shopstewards from Packers are discussing how the union 
first came into their factory. One of them, David, was at that 
time a full-time organiser for UTP.
DAVID: The response of the workers was very poor. I was 
coming to wait outside the company gates at 5.45am, to meet 
the morning shift, then I picked them up at the gate and 
went to the location to make some kind of caucus meeting. 
And afternoon 3 pm, 5 pm, pick up few, few, few. It was a 
poor response to start, but after time people began to get 
involved.
GEORGE: At that time people were not aware what was a union, 
what was a union's duties, how does a union help workers. 
They saw it as an insurance company.
VINCINT: During that time people never had experience of 
trade unions...
DAVID: I started in 1978 to organise strongly. Early 78. 
People started to come clear to the union 1979.
Vincint recalls a strike in 1981, when he first joined the 
company, over management's attempt to retrench supervisors. The 
workers at Packers struck for a day:
It didn't only work for the benefit of Packers workers, but
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neighbouring companies were also asking themselves, How did 
these workers go on strike and yet they still remain in 
their jobs? That's when SFAWU decided to have volunteers 
going around organising on weekends - people like George and 
Maseko, and I was involved in Nigel. I was living there at 
the time. Well, it brought some light to people, that if you 
are united in a union there's something that you can do.
It also strengthened the power of the workers in the 
factory. They went all out in supporting the union, because 
they saw now they'd got a shield for protection.
The volunteers were shop stewards at Packers.
GEORGE: The idea behind it was to get more strength, it 
mustn't be only Packers, because by that time we were joined 
under one federation, FOSATU. MAWU and Chemical and other 
affiliates were not yet organised in that area. Now we took 
it upon ourselves that this is our duty, to go and organise. 
In case of any action, we must do it jointly, in order to be 
effective. That's how MAWU came into the area. We used to 
have huge factories in Nigel, like Union Carriage, about 
1000 members there. It was organised by SFAWU.
VINCINT: The idea came from the shop stewards, that we 
cannot always be fighting all by ourselves, watching other 
people just sitting outside. It came from Packers.
In fact we at Packers were already discussing that even in 
the townships we are faced with problems, so for the people 
to be ready to tackle these problems they've got first to be 
organised in their places of work. Then when they're going 
outside the factory they're still meeting the very same 
people but now in the township.
We saw that it would be difficult for people to just in the 
township be united, and fight whatever problems they were 
having, whereas they were still unable to fight their 
employers at work. But that was proved in KwaThema after the 
bus boycott that the community can be united, provided now 
that we preach the gospel that they should be united under
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unions. And it would be easier to fight any problem that 
might be faced by them (Packers shop stewards, 1987).
A PWAWU organiser, who was based in Springs in the early 1980s, 
recalls how the SSC was started:
The Springs local was formed around the end of 82, or the 
beginning of 83, during that time when things were rather 
hot and people needed each other for solidarity. Workers 
would distance themselves from a strike, thinking that that 
kind of dispute would never come to them. That kind of unity 
made other workers aware that a problem affecting 
metalworkers is the same as a problem affecting food 
workers... So workers were learning how to go about solving 
their problems, because they will learn from other shop 
stewards in the area...
The Springs local started so that affiliates could get to 
know each other, shop stewards could know each other...
By a hot time, I mean there were community activities 
affecting the workers... It was then that the East Rand came 
up very strongly in the community... by that time workers 
felt if they could divorce themselves from the community 
then they would really land in problems...
Locals were not so, under FOSATU, it was only towards the 
formation of COSATU that the whole structure of locals came 
up, by seeing the importance of having links with the 
community. That was how locals came to be formed, in my 
understanding. I think in fact that was the main aim. 
Workers on their own could not push everything, in fact even 
now they cannot push everything without aligning with other 
organisations... so that was the main aim.
At the beginning
The main factories were in the food industry, some PWAWU, 
also MAWU, Textile had about 1. About six as a rough 
estimate... By the time COSATU was formed the East Rand was 
mature, straightaway, because that local assisted in
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organising even unorganised factories. Chemical did not have 
factories in Springs, but Gillette, Fibreglass, they were 
organised by the SSC. Going out and organising, and also 
meeting them at community organisations, they would talk to 
them, and it was then that the whole spirit of joining the 
unions grew higher and higher...
At the local each union had to give a factory report, and it 
would be then that SFAWU would come up and say, "Comrades, 
we are having this problem and we need your support in this 
way. " If a person is needing solidarity, then they need to 
come up clearly as to what it is exactly, and it would be 
best if it is referred to the community.
The local discussed factory developments, wage achievements, 
disputes, that's how shop stewards taught one another... 
Ways of tackling management, others would learn from others. 
Coming back to community issues - education, community 
councillors, rising prices at shops and fares (Nomathemba, 
1987) .
Where the PWAWU organiser sees the formation of the locals as 
being integrally linked to a concern with community issues, the 
Packers shop stewards saw the locals as being based on the FOSATU 
constitution. As a result they were being formed in different 
areas around 1981/82. They were formed to strengthen FOSATU and 
its affiliates, rather than to take up community issues:
When we started we discussed factory problems, but 
eventually we saw we were also having township problems, we 
cannot just leave them like that. So we asked ourselves how 
are we going to tackle them. I think the first problems we 
had were with the councillors because people were 
dissatisfied with the way they were operating - bribes, high 
rents, housing shortage was the most crucial (Packers shop 
stewards, 1987 ).*-
1. See also interview with Mzwakhe, quoted below, where he 
describes the need to build solidarity and extend organising as 
the reason for starting Katlehong local.
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Vincint also spoke about the beginnings of the local:
The council met once a week, or twice a week if it came to a 
push. At that time there were still few companies organised. 
SFAWU played a role organising most of the companies into 
FOSATU... We organised workers regardless of industry, only 
to bring them into FOSATU, because we were short of 
organisers... By now about 60% of the companies in Springs 
are under COSATU.
We did face difficulties because we lacked experience. There 
were only a few people experienced in unionism - Chris 
Dlamini, Enoch Godongwana, Nelson, the Textile president - 
they gave us all the guidelines we needed then.
Then we had some problems with some other affiliates, 
because of political differences, the local went a bit slow. 
Most of the things we were supposed to do came to a 
standstill. Until at a later stage we decided to resume our 
local and iron out our differences.
SFAWU was moving very fast, and even the shop stewards in 
SFAWU were proving more experienced, because we were 
participating more, also in other organisations like 
community organisations, though they were not as strong as 
they are now. We as SFAWU, if we didn't have any meetings on 
weekends, called in comrades from other affiliates and had 
seminars to look in our progress as a local and our progress 
in FOSATU...
FOSATU was gaining ground, and there were some stoppages 
here and there. The local did support any company that was 
under pressure... For example, there was a strike at TEMSA. 
All the workers were dismissed. The local played a very big 
role, we even donated, we assisted in negotiations, we 
assisted in their meetings. Well, it took us some time to 
bring the workers back to the union, because management won 
the case even in court, and very few were reinstated. Bu* we 
told ourselves we'll never leave TEMSA like it is. Even now 
it is again organised, under NUMSA.
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l&J at that time was organised by Food Bev [a CUSA 
affiliate]. Other companies in that area assisted SFAWU in 
organising the workers and we eventually got the majority. 
The local also organised PUTCO under T&GWU (Vincint, 1987).
According to Mzwakhe, a MAWU shop steward who became Springs 
organiser in mid-1983,
When I arrived here there was no strong local. SFAWU was the 
only strong union here, there was no other union. So with us 
coming in here, having strong factories, we decided to 
launch a SSC. That was launched in 1983. Before I was 
employed we already had a number of factories. The Packers 
guys pulled out a number of factories from Engineering and 
Allied - Ringrollers, GEC, Raleigh, Boart. Then the need for 
an organiser came. That was through the Packers guys.
To me the local started because of the tradition that 
developed at Katlehong, that a local is needed in terms of 
organising, in terms of solidarity, in terms of discussing 
issues that affect us as a trade union movement. Already 
Chris [Chris Dlamini, SFAWU shop steward and FOSATU 
president] had this thing in mind, but the problem was there 
was only SFAWU in the East Rand. We discussed that we need 
to have a local like other areas. What was advantageous was 
that there were no guidelines from the FOSATU CC, so each 
local could approach its problems as it sees. Hence, in our 
local we had delegates from the students, the youth and 
ERAPO, although that was not FOSATU policy. That was later, 
in 1985 (Mzwakhe, 1987).
Mzwakhe had been a shop steward on the executive of the Katlehong 
SSC, which was initiated by MAWU organiser Moses Mayekiso to help 
organise and consolidate factories in the area, although later it 
began taking up a specific community issue, the demolition of 
shacks in Katlehong. This SSC was then copied in other areas, 
particularly in the Transvaal (ibid).
The Springs SSC also started to take up community issues:
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GEORGE: At that time [ 1983 or 1984 - see Mzwakhe ( 1987 )] 
there were a lot of problems in the location. PUTCO took 
over the bus service. After 6 weeks it came with an 
increase, and at the other end we were faced with a rental 
increase. It was then people started to realise, that they 
are the people to stand up and challenge them.
VINCINT: The bus boycott was organised through the FOSATU 
SSC, so shop stewards were asked to go back to their 
factories and find out whether the workers were accepting 
the increase. But already the feeling was that workers are 
not going to accept. So you must know that if workers are 
going to discuss this today in their factories, they are 
also going to discuss with their neighbours, who are also 
workers. So that discussion went round in the township, and 
it was decided the time was ripe. That's how it was 
organised...
GEORGE: In fact we made it a point that every shop steward, 
he must take it upon himself that it's his duty, whether 
he's in a bus or a taxi, wherever the people are, in a 
shebeen, or wherever we meet together, that we preach this 
thing, that people should be aware that there is this thing, 
to take place tomorrow. That's how it was supported...
What you must also understand was that we were operating 
when there was no civic body in the township that could co­
ordinate that kind of action...
It was just called azikwelwe. No name of the affiliates. 
Because if we came out openly we might be under attack by 
the state. It was also said that when people are riding the 
buses they should also preach the gospel. It was not only 
workers who were in those buses (Packers shop stewards, 
1987) .
According to the shop stewards the boycott lasted about a month, 
but was then called off because of the suffering of old people, 
the cold, and confusion sown by the community councillors. But 
PUTCO was forced to meet a delegation of shop stewards, and to 
accept the principle of consultation. The shop stewards argued
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that the boycott stimulated union organisation because people 
were aware that "they can do anything under a union", as well as 
student and youth organisation (ibid). In a later interview 
Vincint felt that the boycott was not a complete success, because 
the community had not been correctly approached, and that they 
had taken it for granted that shop stewards would spread the 
word, which they in fact had not done systematically enough 
(Vincint, 1987 ) .
It was this sort of perception that led to the formation of a 
branch of the East Rand People's Organisation (ERAPO) in 
KwaThema:
DAVID: Another thing was people felt they needed to fall 
under organisation, because ERAPO was formed then.
VINCINT: A few months after the boycott a civic organisation 
was formed... called ERAPO. It was started just before the 
state of emergency, 1984. [there was some discussion as to 
whether it was 84 or 85, but they settled on 84].
The idea for ERAPO came from the SSC, because we felt that 
now there were community issues that cannot be tackled by 
the SSC alone. Whilst some of the things are in the factory, 
there are other things in the township which need to be 
attended to. We as the SSC can't address ourselves to all 
the community problems we are having. So it is important 
that we preach the gospel that a civic body be formed, to 
cater for all the organisations in the township (Packers 
shop stewards, 1987).
Zakes, a shop steward in Springs and senior office-bearer in 
FOSATU, describes a similar process, but focuses on different 
events:
In our area at the time we had the FOSATU SSC meeting almost 
every week. At some stage it was only the members of the 
trade union that were attending. But some factories 
retrenched people, some others closed down, which meant that 
the members of the trade union did not have any work any 
more. They were now a burden to the workers who were still
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employed. Sometimes they would lose direction, sometimes 
they would act against the interests of those employed. On 
the other hand there were students who had formed themselves 
into student organisations which were waging the struggle 
for a better education and for SRCs, and DET [The Department 
of Education and Training] was not prepared to accept that. 
In some areas the unemployed were used by certain elements 
to attack the students, and we were sort of in the middle, 
because we were still employed, but an organised grouping, 
and we were called on to intervene, I mean we felt that we 
must intervene. The only way to intervene was to start 
organising the unemployed into their own union, allowing 
them to participate in our council, and allowing the youth 
also to participate in our council, so that they can give 
their side of the story. That happened. But at the time, 
1984, there was a lot of killing by the state.
Those killings demanded that the workers should also do 
something about it. It was felt that it was not enough to 
have the unemployed and the youth together in the SSC, the 
vast majority of our people were still outside. They were 
not involved in what the students or the unemployed or the 
shop stewards have decided to do. So they formed themselves 
in what is called ERAPO, affiliated to UDF. That included 
shop owners, shebeen owners, taxi owners, and civic 
organisations. That embraced the whole of the township. 
Every week there would be a meeting of the SSC. Every 
fortnight there would be a meeting of ERAPO. That 
organisation included youth, students, unemployed, employed 
and other organisations like I have mentioned, taxi owners 
and shebeen owners. That in itself brought together 
everybody. Now, when a decision was taken [for example] 
there was going to be a funeral, all these organisations 
would be part of the decision. If it was decided that the 
funeral would take place during the week, it means taxi 
owners, shop and shebeen owners would close down on that 
day. That was not imposed on them, they were part of the 
decision. So you would find at the funeral taxis were 
ferrying people because PUTCO was boycotted at the t-‘me. 
Shopowners would contribute some groceries to the funeral. 
Everybody would be there. So that's how the whole thing
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developed into one, until the state of emergency, and the 
leadership of ERAPO was detained, as it is now still in the 
township. So ERAPO is not functioning well now. But the SSC 
still invites the unemployed, and the youth, to their 
meetings.
People become members of ERAPO as individuals. People do not 
represent their organisations there. In the SSC the youth 
do represent their organisation. If the shop stewards had 
discussed any issue they would send delegates as 
representatives to ERAPO, although some members of ERAPO 
were members of the SSC, they would send people as 
representatives of SSC. They would send the chair and 
secretary.
Q: Where did the initiative for ERAPO come from?
It came from the workers. They started rallying round some 
known figures in the township, some were professionals, some 
were personnel officers in some factories, some were 
shopowners, some were just ordinary people, started getting 
those together, and then started organising in the area 
where they were living, and they started this ERAPO thing.
Q: So the main initiative was coming from the organised 
workers?
From the organised workers, yes. Yes it was discussed in the 
SSC.
ERAPO covers Kwathema, and there was a branch in Daveyton, a 
branch in Boksburg, one in Wattville, one in Duduza, and 
Tsakane.
Q: How was the parents' organisation formed?
It was initiated by the SSC. First of all it invited 
teachers. At that meeting we discussed the uprisings, the 
boycotts, whatever. It was felt that the teachers would talk 
to the parents to appeal to the children to go back to 
school. And we appealed to the teachers to look at the
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question of the SRCs, because that was the main problem. We 
then decided to call a meeting of all the parents in the 
township, all the teachers and students. We had a meeting in 
our hall at Kwathema, where elections took place. People 
were elected to be the convener of this type of meeting. 
About 8 people were elected, and that was called the 
students-parents-teachers committee.
The initiative came from the SSC. It was endorsed by ERAPO. 
Because in fact the chairman of ERAPO was chairing that 
meeting (Zakes, 1987b).
It was this committee that organised the KwaThema stayaway on 
October 22, in support of the demands of the students.
The picture painted in these interviews is of the SSC as an organ 
closely bound up in community issues, and stimulating the 
formation of a number of community organisations. Besides the 
formation of the organisation of the unemployed called the 
Amalova, the Springs branch of ERAPO, and the students-parents- 
teacher committee discussed above, key members of the SSC were 
instrumental in setting up the local COSAS branch as well:
Other organisations had already spoken about establishing 
youth and student organisations, but the local, the 
executive of the local invited some high school students and 
youth, and discussed the need for such organisations. It 
started from there, it grew, and they elected their own 
executive. Today we still work hand in hand with the 
students and youth.
That was in late 83 or early 84. There was no COSAS here 
until we called the Joburg branch to come and assist us. So 
that tomorrow it mustn't be said that FOSATU is behind the 
whole thing, we said that the people who are belonging to it 
should take over. Even as far as Duduza and Heidelburg 
whilst organising workers we preached that the students and 
youth must get organised (Vincint, 1987).
The SSC's strong roots in the community were demonstrated when a 
split developed in MAWU's Transvaal branch, resulting in a
31
breakaway union, UMMAWOSA, which was at its strongest in the 
Springs-Nigel-Brakpan area. Mzwakhe, one of the officials who 
went with the new union, described the response of the SSC:
People were insisting that if it's a FOSATU council we 
should not be in because we were no longer affiliates of 
FOSATU. But shop stewards felt that no, we cannot sit away 
from these workers. The fact that they are not affiliated to 
FOSATU does not necessarily mean that they are not workers. 
So we had to change the whole structure and have an East 
Rand Workers' Council rather than a FOSATU SSC. The ERWC was 
progressive in the sense that it linked up with community 
issues such as the bus boycott, and had a strong alliance 
with COSAS since 1984 (Mzwakhe, 1987).
This is echoed by Robert, former MAWU shop steward, and then 
UMMAWOSA shop steward:
MAWU said we should be taken out of the meeting because we 
weren't affiliates of FOSATU. Most of the unions didn't 
agree. Because this local was built by the people of 
KwaThema, not by FOSATU. And because these are workers, we 
also feel that we are not chasing any workers out of 
KwaThema. At some stage MAWU withdrew, saying it's a 
community local, not a FOSATU local, because we discussed 
township problems and gave other organisations speaking 
rights (Robert, 1987b).
My interview sources give me a variety of dates for the founding 
of the Springs SSC. Vincint indicates that it started around 
1981/2, and that the idea for it came from the FOSATU 
constitution which specified that local SSCs be formed. Mzwakhe 
found no SSC when he arrived in Springs as a MAWU organiser in 
mid-83, and helped to found it in that year. For him what 
inspired the formation of the Springs SSC was the tradition of 
the Katlehong SSC, of which he had direct experience. The PWAWU 
organiser recalls the SSC starting in 82 or early 83 in order to 
build union solidarity as well as engage in community struggles. 
Baskin writes that the Springs Council was formed in 1981, and 
that its proposed aims were to make "links with community 
organisations to encourage solidarity between the community and
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the workers' struggle." The Council aimed "to meet only 'once a 
year' and for its work to be carried out by sub-committees." 
(Baskin, 1982: 53) When Baskin's article was shown to Vincint he 
said it was wrong in that they met once or twice a week.
The discrepancy in dates is explained by the lull in the SSC' s 
activities mentioned by Vincint and confirmed by Zakes (1987c), 
when MAWU apparently withdrew because of political differences in 
1982/3. This issue needs further researching.
The interviews show how, as organisation became stronger in the 
few organised factories, workers saw the need to spread the 
message and organise other factories so as to strengthen their 
union and their federation. Since there was a shortage of 
organisers, shop steward volunteers took up the challenge, 
organising not only in Springs but in other parts of the East 
Rand, and as far away as Pretoria, and not only for their own 
union, SFAWU, but for other FOSATU affiliates as well. The SSC 
was then formed in order to facilitate this organising, to enable 
shop stewards to learn from each others' shopfloor struggles, and 
to build solidarity between the different affiliates.
Thus the trade unions, by organising several factories, generated 
a momentum towards the increasing consciousness amongst workers 
of shared problems, of a common situation, and of the need to 
build solidarity, build organisation that could unite workers as 
a class at the point of production. The formation of the SSC was 
a stage in developing greater solidarity and class as distinct 
from factory or sectional trade union consciousness.
As for the relation to community struggles, it is difficult to 
say whether that was an aim of the SSC from its inception. 
Certainly with hindsight all the participants I interviewed see 
engaging in community struggle as inseparable from the role of 
the SSC. But Mzwakhe insisted that SSCs that were started at that 
time aimed simply to develop trade union organisation, not to 
engage in community struggle (Mzwakhe, 1987b). Possibly SSCs that 
were formed later in FOSATU's history, and which would have been 
modelled on the Katlehong and Springs locals, were set up with 
the intention of engaging in community struggles, as the PWAWU 
organiser's interview suggests.
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Certainly, by 1983 or 1984 the Springs local had developed enough 
cohesion and strength to became a forum in which burning 
community problems could be discussed and action considered. 
Hence the 1983 ( 1984?) bus boycott. Although with its mass base 
and firm structures the SSC proved effective in extending the 
boycott into the community, the limitations of a structure which 
was based on organised factories and had only informal means of 
organising the community became apparent to the shop stewards. 
The SSC had to deal with its own business, and could not cope 
with all the community issues. Most important of all, even when 
it included representatives from the youth, the students and the 
Amalova, "the vast majority of our people were outside."
So it became necessary for shop stewards to "preach the gospel 
that a civic be formed." The advantage of ERAPO was that it 
"embraced the whole township", including youth, unemployed, 
employed, women, as well as petty bourgeois elements such as 
shop-, shebeen- and taxi-owners, ie all residents. Thus all 
sectors would be involved in making and supporting decisions. 
Although people were members of ERAPO as individuals, it seems to 
have had powers of calling meetings where various organisations 
(ie students, shebeen-owners, SSC, etc) would meet as 
organisations to consider a programme of action. Vincint 
mentioned an action committee which consisted of representatives 
of various organisations, but which also formed part of ERAPO 
structures (Vincint, 1987).
But despite the structural limits imposed on the SSC by its base 
in the trade unions, the solidarity it gave birth to extended 
beyond the realm of shopfloor struggles and generated a powerful 
sense of community, and of the need to organise all sectors in 
the community. Thus activists stimulated student organisation, 
but called in COSAS, recognising that the student sector needed 
its independent form of organisation, just as they had recognised 
that the civic sector should fall within ERAPO's structures.
Although the SSC was based in the factories, the fact that it 
represented workers from the same community turned it into a 
forum where common community problems would almost inevitably be 
raised. The experience of community struggle demonstrated the
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need for a range of community organisations and these meshed with 
national initiatives (COSAS, UDF). Thus there was an extension of 
workers' consciousness and organisation into the community and 
into the terrain of national political struggle, as they took up 
the task of organising the people.
KwaThema appears to have been a relatively unorganised township, 
with no previous traditions of Congress organisation (Mzwakhe, 
1987). There was an AZAPO branch until the early 1980s, which 
then "vanished". The lack of organisation gave the SSC a vitally 
important role in organising the community.
In this the Springs SSC does not seem to have been typical. The 
Katlehong local, for example, manifested the same shift towards 
engaging in community struggles, but with two differences. 
Swilling noticed a "subtle dampening" of these issues by union 
organisers in 1982 (Swilling, 1983: 139-40), which culminated in 
the FOSATU Regional Executive's decision that the SSC should not 
take action over shack demolitions (Mzwakhe, 1987). (This 
interpretation is, however, contested; another is that FOSATU had 
no policy to deal with such an issue and did not know how to take 
it up. This led to much dissatisfaction on the East Rand. Erwin, 
1987). Swilling also noted that "SSC members were extremely wary, 
as evidenced in their negotiations with ERAPO, about forming 
alliances with non-workers and elements of the middle class.” 
(ibid: 157) That was, of course, in 1982, whereas the Springs 
shop stewards established the KwaThema branch of ERAPO in 1984; 
much had changed in the meantime, not least ERAPO itself. 
Mzwakhe, himself a founder member of ERAPO, a member of the 
executive of the Katlehong SSC in 1982, and instrumental in 
setting up the KwaThema ERAPO branch when he was an organiser 
there in 1984, described ERAPO as being exceedingly weak in 
Katlehong at the time.
Still, having noted these points, the attitude of the Springs 
workers to community organisation seems to have been very 
different to that of the Germiston workers. Perhaps if the FOSATU 
REC had been able to assist the Katlehong workers in taking 
action over the shack demolitions the experience of community 
struggle might have had the same affect on them as the bus 
boycott had on the Springs workers.
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The process of becoming involved in community struggles was 
facilitated in the case of Springs by its relatively small size, 
and the fact that most of its industrial workers come from one 
township.
The point, however, is that the Springs SSC had a history of 
close involvement with community struggles and organisations, and 
of sympathy to the UDF and Congress politics. Thus the mass 
struggles of 1984/5 did not precipitate a struggle within the SSC 
over whether to participate or not; rather, Springs SSC became a 
force in other locals and affiliates of FOSATU pushing for 
participation in the escalating popular struggles of those years, 
as will be shown below.
3.2 SCHOOL BOYCOTTS, STAYAWAYS AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
The object of this section is to examine the impact of the 
popular struggles of 1984/5 on organisation and consciousness in 
KwaThema. This theme will re-emerge below, where I will examine 
the effect of popular struggle on FOSATU more generally.
For Vincint
1984 was a tough year, but it was the starting point for 
most organisations. Organisations saw the only way forward 
was as organisations [rather than as single organisations 
isolated from each other].
Students and youth were militant, civics developed. He was on the 
executive of the Duduza Civic, where he lived at the time. They 
invited Motlana from the Soweto Civic to give them advice. The 
ERAPO branch in KwaThema was launched.
The school boycotts exposed the whole community to the 
reality of the state, when they were harassing students, 
because maybe you are on night shift, you wake up, there is 
teargas, students being beaten up, things like that. So 
people flocked to our meetings, specifically to find out
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what to do about the plight of the students. So I think that 
conscientised most of the people. Even the pensioners, I 
remember we had 3 or 4 combis just for the pensioners 
(Vincint, 1987 ) .
Zakes makes the same point:
... there was a feeling from workers on the ground that they 
cannot just observe students being killed or detained 
without workers being involved, because the very same 
students were children of the workers, so we saw workers at 
the time starting to push to form parents organisations... 
(Zakes, 1987b)
School grievances were linked to community grievances in 
mobilising for the October 22 stayaway organised by the 
parents/students/teachers committee discussed by Zakes, and which 
was 80% successful according to Vincint (Vincint, 1987).
The next step in the developing mass struggles was the Transvaal­
wide stayaway on the 5 and 6 November 1984. Vincint saw the 
Springs SSC playing an important role in recommending or even 
initiating the stayaway in the FOSATU structures. The local had 
suggested the stayaway should take place in 7 days time to give 
the government no time to prepare. But this was modified, in the 
CEC he thought, to give the federation time to approach 
progressive political organisations, which Springs agreed to. The 
Springs local also played a role by "going out and preaching in 
other locals." (ibid)
The PWAWU organiser remembers it somewhat differently. She 
recalls the initiative for the stayaway coming from COSAS, which 
wrote a letter to the federation inviting it to a meeting. 
Through the arguments of FOSATU shop stewards the date for the 
stayaway was shifted from the 30 October, which prevented "some 
commotions that might have happened", since workers would have 
been unhappy about missing payday.
Our delegates knew they were going to discuss the stayaway, 
but what they had in mind was not to be pushed into a date 
that would not be suitable to the workers, that would not
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have given a chance to go and discuss with the shopfloor 
(Nomathemba, 1987).
Zakes, from his vantage point as FOSATU office bearer, remembers 
the internal struggles over the stayaway:
It came about because Transvaal region took a decision, and
/
that decision was taken to the Central Committee, and in the 
end people agreed that we have to work closer with the 
students, but not that we should take action. Transvaal 
capitalised on that loophole. But after the stayaway there 
was a complaint within FOSATU that people have taken their 
own decision and now they've put FOSATU in this position. 
But Transvaal capitalised on the fact that look, we did 
agree to start working with the youth and trying to direct 
the youth, and that was one of the actions people took to 
get the youth to come closer and start working with them...
It was the Transvaal region, together with COSAS, that 
initiated the stayaway call (Zakes, 1987b).
1985 was politically a highly charged year. According to Vincint, 
initially ERAPO did not enjoy the support of the whole community, 
since it was formed just after the Community Council elections,
and many had high hopes of the councillors. But in early 1985
ERAPO became popular. When students had problems, ERAPO would 
send a delegation to meet the principals and inspectors. They met 
with councillors and the township manager over housing problems, 
and managed to prevent some evictions. ERAPO started to build a 
street committee structure:
At first it was difficult, people were quite afraid, because 
already there was this state harassment, but in other areas
they were very strong and functioning. In an area there
would be say 15 streets with 15 street committees, but they 
would elect one area committee. So if this street was having 
a problem it would go to the area committee to seek advice. 
From the area committee it goes straight to the executive 
(Vincint, 1987).
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During this period
People took a decision here that for every child killed 
there would be a stayaway. . . Hence the stayaway was 100% 
because it wasn't a decision taken by a few, it was taken by 
the parents, ERAPO, the unemployed (Zakes, 1987b).
But then came the first State of Emergency, imposed by the state
in mid-1985:
Unfortunately, when the street committees were functioning 
really properly, then came the state of emergency and they 
were crushed. That was one thing that killed ERAPO in 
KwaThema and other East Rand areas. Most of the executive 
were picked up, some of the youth ran away, comrades went 
into hiding. Very few were left. Only a few of the street 
committees were left. Most of the leadership in the street 
committees was also detained. ERAPO was only a few months 
old, so once you remove such people... that's how ERAPO was 
crushed...
ERAPO did continue to operate, but in a very low key fashion,
meeting in small groups, helping organise funerals and so on.
I think an additional problem, if the shop stewards had 
really wanted to keep ERAPO alive they wouldn't have left it 
just after the state of emergency, but most of them 
panicked. They were also afraid to attend their locals. Only 
a few attended, because there were always hippos standing 
nearby. But we simply went inside and said, if they want to 
pick us all up it's their baby, it's not our baby.
The other problem was we no longer had places to meet, for 
ERAPO. Various places were used, but then the owners said 
no, you're bringing the police to me.
So people at the forefront had a tough task, they also had 
to visit other townships to see that they're going all 
right.
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After a few months attendance at the local improved, after 
we visited all the companies and told the shop stewards that 
we've got to continue. We even decided to have our local 
meetings at the companies, and approached management about 
that. I remember we had one meeting here at Packers. Until 
the Springs Chamber of Commerce pressurised the authorities 
to give us back our venue in the township. Then the shop 
stewards came back to us.
As a response to the emergency the SSC and ERAPO organised a 
boycott of white owned shops in Springs, Nigel and Brakpan, which 
was "very successful". The demands of the boycott were to address 
the students demands, an end to harassment of organisations, and 
the release of detainees.
You could see if you went to the union offices on Friday, 
the place was empty. It was only a few people from the farms 
who'd come in and buy, because they never knew what was 
happening.
Some businessmen exploited the situation, so as a local and 
as ERAPO we met them, we also met the East Rand region of 
NAFCOC. Prices were varying from shop to shop. NAFCOC was 
very positive, they produced a price list which we could use 
to check prices. We could then insist on the right price, or 
send the address of the shop to them.
The Chamber of Commerce sent telexes to the government, promised 
money for bail and for supporting families of detainees, and 
helped in many ways, although they were unable to ensure the 
community's demands were met. The Chamber also arranged a meeting 
between the local Nationalist MP and the boycott leaders. The 
boycott was called off after 4 months, when the Community Council 
started a KwaThema Action Committee to persuade people to break 
the boycott, and used buses to transport people to town to buy. 
This caused "misunderstanding" in the community, and it was 
decided to call off the boycott until the community was 
reorganised (Vincint, 1987).
With ERAPO inoperative, the SSC with its student, youth and 
Amalova representatives has to stand in on civic issues (See
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above, Zakes; interview with Packers shop stewards 18.6.87; 
Vincint 6.8.87.). However,
But what we've seen is the local cannot cope with all the 
work and problems, so we are thinking of reviving ERAPO 
again (Vincint, 1987).
This period of popular struggle was characterised by a massive 
politicisation of the community, and increased participation in 
organisation and action. It needs to be emphasised how important 
the role of the youth and students and their struggles were in 
this general politicisation. The turmoil in the schools and the 
brutality of repression was brought right into the heart of the 
family. The fact that parents now had organisations themselves, 
as well as experience of struggle, combined with the general 
political climate created by the Tricameral elections and the 
UDF's campaigns, gave them the understanding and the means to 
support their children, unlike in 1976.
The wave of mass mobilisation crystallised out in new forms of 
organisation under the umbrella of ERAPO - street and zone 
committees. The interviews show how effective the State of 
Emergency was in crushing this initiative and instilling fear in 
the people. None the less, an effective boycott of white-owned 
shops was launched which forced the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Nationalist MP to meet the boycott leaders. The boycott also 
opened the way for an alliance with township traders and a degree 
of popular control over prices.
The UDF was an important presence in these struggles.
Immediately after ERAPO was formed [referring to the 
KwaThema branch] we met the UDF to discuss affiliation. We 
went back to the people and they gave us the go ahead. UDF 
also helped us in the boycott, with a pamphlet, things like 
that. Also in strategies to be used. They also helped with 
detentions, with legal representatives. That's why the UDF 
is today so popular within our communities (Vincint, 1987).
UDF also provided speakers from outside the township at meetings, 
which made them more interesting to the people. It was through
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these sorts of involvement in community struggles that the 
popularity of the UDF and the whole national liberation movement 
deepened in the townships.
3.3 THE EAST RAND PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION
The story of the SSC entailed the story of how the KwaThema 
branch of ERAPO was formed. But it is necessary also to tell the 
story of ERAPO itself, from the point of view of one of the 
activists who was involved in it from the start. Mzwakhe became a 
MAWU shop steward in Germiston in 1982, MAWU organiser in Springs 
in 1983, and UMMAWOSA organiser in 1984.
ERAPO was formed in Thokoza in 1979 or 1980 by Elijah, Sam Ntuli, 
Mzwakhe and others.
We started ERAPO because we saw we needed a vehicle to 
challenge the day to day problems of the people. We saw the 
people were ready, but there were no organisations. We were 
looking at the problems in the whole East Rand. We saw a 
link between the problems on the whole East Rand...
We did not know what our position was. Most of the people 
were BC inclined. We had no link with AZAPO, although some 
of the guys were involved. Probably they thought we would 
develop an alliance or even become part of AZAPO...
Most of us became union organisers. Elijah became an 
organiser for SAAWU, Sam was employed by FOSATU Workers 
Project and later became a MAWU organiser, I became a member 
of MAWU, Vuyo Nduna became an organiser for T&GWU. This 
shaped our thinking and injected a class content within the 
thinking of ERAPO, before we became a strong organisation. 
ERAPO only became strong in 1983/84...
Our experience in MAWU shifted us to. adopt a non-racial 
position, but Elijah shifted more and had more of a broader 
position than we had because SAAWU already had a clear
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position. While on our side, Sam and myself and others, were 
still vacillating, while adopting the non-racial position 
but not clear about the broader congress position. People 
like Elijah shaped ERAPO's direction. By 1984 we all had a 
similar position.
Mzwakhe joined MAWU in 1982, and became factory delegate at the 
BEC; Transvaal treasurer; member of the MAWU NEC; and national 
chair of the FOSATU Barlow Rand shop stewards council.
I must be honest, the whole idea of class analysis came 
through those discussions in MAWU, because of its emphasis 
on the question of class. That also shaped my thinking, I 
must be honest on that point.
It [ie class analysis] influenced ERAPO in that we discussed 
the nature of our struggle in our country. And injecting 
working class practices in ERAPO - having proper structures, 
mandates, recall - those are working class practices. And 
looking at the nature of the society we would like to 
create...
Through discussions and reading, through "looking at the concrete 
conditions" and "at the history of the struggle and the working 
class movement", Mzwakhe became convinced that the Congress 
political position was the "scientific position" with a correct 
grasp of oppression and exploitation.
I became critical of Joe Forster's position, as if FOSATU 
was the beginning of the working class movement.
The story of the political and intellectual development of 
Mzwakhe and his comrades provides insight into the close relation 
between national oppression and class exploitation in working 
class townships. The group of dynamic young men with vaguely 
Black Consciousness leanings start a community organisation with 
no clear idea of how it is going to organise; a number of them, 
being politically aware and talented, are drawn into harsh 
shopfloor struggles being waged on the East Rand at the time. 
They become union shop stewards and organisers. There they learn 
about non-racialism and class analysis, reject Black
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Consciousness, and become committed to the idea of making ERAPO a 
working class organisation. All of them, however, having started 
off as community activists, find FOSATU's abstention from 
community struggles and down-playing of the struggle against 
apartheid unsatisfying, and start to turn to the political
tradition that contains all of these elements: non-racialism, a 
national struggle against oppression, a presence at all sites of 
struggle, and a powerful working class component in a popular
alliance. Some become leading figures in the more Congress-
sympathetic affiliates of FOSATU; others have political clashes 
with FOSATU leadership and become part of the breakaway UMMAWOSA; 
others of course are already in unions with a Congress political 
position. But their experience as unionists shapes their practice 
and their ideology within the Congress tradition: they are firmly 
committed to working class hegemony in the national liberation 
movement. Shop stewards play a leading role in the community 
organisations they develop and the struggles they lead.
ERAPO started in Thokoza, but the first mass campaign it engaged 
in seems to have been the Daveyton campaign against rent
increases.
In 1983 the stronghold shifted to Daveyton, with Solly 
Klaas, Vuyo Nduna and others becoming prominent...
At that point, I must be honest, we were inexperienced in 
the first place. We'd sit as a committee, not trying to 
recruit membership, look at the issues, and simply appeal on 
the masses, call large mass meetings and so on. To borrow 
Dave Lewis' term, "appealing to the masses out there".
That's how we stopped the rent increase in Daveyton. With 
pamphlets, calling on people, drawing about 15000 people in 
Daveyton [to a mass meeting?], so they had to back down on 
the rent increase. That was Tom Mboya (the mayor of the 
community council). Daveyton became a stronghold of ERAPO as 
a result of that. But what we failed to do, and that was 
inexperience on our part, was to transform that into 
concrete organisation with relevant structures...
When I was appointed by MAWU to operate as an organiser in
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Springs, we had some problems. There was a strike at Union 
Carriage in Nigel on the 11 and 12 October 1983, and then a 
two week strike in 1984. Because the Community Council 
blocked us from having meetings, workers decided to 
challenge the council. So my argument was that you cannot 
challenge the council through a trade union, a trade union 
is not the right forum to do that. The Duduza Civic 
Association was already defunct. When we thought about it we 
said, Look, people, the best way is not to form a new 
organisation, but to try talk to the guys and actually 
revive the DCA. That's how the Civic Association was 
revived. We also thought we needed allies within the 
community by building strong organisation at community 
level.
In KwaThema, since there was no civic association, we 
decided to go another direction, by forming ERAPO. Our view 
of ERAPO was that it operated at two levels, as a civic and 
also at the political level. Where there's no civic it would 
operate as a civic. Where there's a civic, it would operate 
as a political organisation rather than restricting itself 
to civic matters. That's how we developed ERAPO...
We had a lull in 1982/3, where we never had an active 
structure, until Mboya tried to increase rent in Daveyton. 
Pamphlets and mass meetings were called, and that revived 
the spirit. Daveyton was our strongest base. Now we started 
moving to other areas trying to make it really an East Rand 
organisation.
We tried to link with the Duduza Civic, which we revived in 
1984, because where there was already a civic we decided not 
to form an alternative organisation, but rather operate at a 
political level. The Wattville branch was started late 84, 
KwaThema 85. We decided not to interfere with Tembisa, 
Duduza and Rotanda, because they already had civics. We had 
a close relation with Duduza and Rotanda civics. In 1985 
there were shack demolitions in Katlehong, where ERAPO took 
a leading role...
We were moving at a time when there was such a lot of
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activity in the townships. We were a lot of inexperienced 
people in terms of the broader democratic struggle. You 
cannot compare us to either the Eastern or Western Cape. The 
reason is that in those areas there were veterans who were 
part of the Congress movement who assisted people in 
developing. We were just people who were committed, who 
wanted an end to the Botha regime, but how? Then we lacked 
that experience.
So even in 1985 we were busy only with the mobilising 
aspect, also with COSAS coming up in all areas. So we had 
mass mobilisation without transforming that into 
organisation. Then when UDF analysed the situation and came 
up with the slogan, "From protest to challenge, from 
mobilisation to organisation", and clarifying what that 
actually means, we had to sit back and do some homework and 
see how do we actually do that.
In Duduza and even in KwaThema we tried forming zone 
committees and street committees. Unfortunately the state 
smashed that at an early stage when it declared the state of 
emergency on 20 July 1985. Then all of us had to be inactive 
for quite a long period of time.
When they came out of detention at the end of the first 
emergency, activists tried to concentrate on rebuilding 
organisation. ERAPO was to be restructured, so that civics would 
be established in each township, with ERAPO as the overall co­
ordinating body for civics. This was partly because it was felt 
people would identify more readily with a KwaThema Civic, for 
example, than with an ERAPO branch. But harassment and detentions 
in this period culminated in the second emergency on June 12, and 
these efforts were smashed.
The process of transforming mobilisation into organisation in 
ERAPO was not a straightforward one. On the one hand Mzwakhe 
describes the impact on the early ERAPO activists of their 
experience as trade unionists, and how this shaped their 
ideology, political position and conception of working class 
structures and practices; but on the other hand they were not 
able to immediately put this conception into practice: ERAPO
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branches were started and strengthened in various townships, and 
became involved in a range of struggles, but it was only in 1985, 
with the political guidance of the UDF which was crystallised in 
the slogan of "From mobilisation to organisation" and "Forward to 
People's Power!" that ERAPO activists started to build the 
structures which are most analogous to trade union structures - 
street committee and zone committees.
This time lag may well have something to do with the specific 
nature of organising in the civic arena: the constituency is 
vastly bigger, broken down into small house units, and consists 
of a range of differing and sometimes antagonistic interests; the 
source of oppression, ie local authorities and the central state, 
are far more intransigent than management in the factories; and 
the capacity of a community to directly cause a loss to the local 
authority is less than a workforce's capacity to halt production. 
It would not make sense to organise a community street committee 
by street committee before a mass mobilisation of residents 
around a common demand has been achieved, because a small number 
of street committees would be unlikely to achieve much, and would 
therefore find it difficult to sustain their members' interest. 
However, once mass mobilisation has been achieved, it might be 
easier to transform it into mass organisation.
It also seems to indicate that there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between solid organisation on the shopfloor and 
solid community organisation; that militants schooled in trade 
union struggle do not necessarily thereby gain the skill 
necessary for broader community and political organising. The 
experience of the East Rand activists was probably reproduced in 
hundreds of townships around the country. Flung into the need to 
organise and lead communities in the midst of a national 
uprising, without theoretical or practical training, it is small 
wonder that they often made mistakes, or relied on mass rallies 
without solid organisational work. In this crisis the national 
leadership and experience of UDF proved crucial in assessing the 
needs of the time and guiding and training community activists, 
providing resources. And all this at a time when the UDF 
leadership, itself undergoing a learning process in the 
startlingly fast-changing conditions, was overextended and 
seriously hampered by the state.
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Mzwakhe saw the fact that ERAPO was guided and dominated by 
activists based in the trade unions as important for the process 
of building strong grassroots organisation:
At the same time the influence of the trade unionists became 
dominant in ERAPO. Most of us decided not to be at the 
executive level, for instance in the 1985 congress of ERAPO 
we decided to decline executive positions, because we wanted 
leadership to grow up in the structures while we are 
assisting in building the structures and shaping the 
direction of ERAPO. In KwaThema also there were one or two 
leading trade union activists who were never part of the 
executive, but actually shaping the direction.
One reason for such an approach was demonstrated a short while 
later in the experience of Duduza:
There is the problem of cross-leadership, like for example 
in Duduza, where most of the guys on the executive of the 
civic are shop stewards and members of the SSC. Experience 
has taught us that is incorrect. If the state moves in it 
smashes two organisations at the same time. In Duduza most 
of our shop stewards are in detention. We need to train our 
membership so that they can assume leadership. [At this 
point in the interview Mzwakhe said that this was the only 
reason for keeping union activists out of civic executives. 
(Mzwakhe, 1987) ].
The fact that so many shop stewards were active in ERAPO, which 
in turn was affiliated to UDF, and in fact comprised the UDF 
presence in the area, must have had the effect of penetrating the 
trade unions with the Congress political tradition; while the 
presence of affiliates such as ERAPO in UDF would contribute to 
the building of working class leadership in the political 
struggle.
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3.4 AMALOVA
The Amalova is the organisation of the unemployed, the "loafers", 
started by retrenched workers in 1983, and affiliated to the 
Springs SSC. Weekly meetings are held in a school in KwaThema. A 
meeting was observed in July2 . The meeting started with about 110 
people present, which later swelled to about 140-50. Roughly half 
the members present were women, some of whom clearly had union or 
political experience and were very militant, others of whom were 
shy about using the clenched fist salute while singing the 
national anthem. There were many men who appeared to be 
unemployed workers, several elderly greybeards as well as numbers 
of youths.
Two of the four executive members present, including the chair, 
were women (the absent executive member is also a woman). The 
meeting conveyed the sense of a strong organisation. Meeting 
procedure was clear, and there was a great deal of participation 
from the floor. People were in good spirits, with plenty of 
laughter and jokes. There was no sense of despondency or apathy, 
such as might be expected from unemployed people.
The executive reported placing 2, 4 and 6 amalova respectively in 
jobs at three companies over the previous week. They described 
problems at three companies. The first was encountered at the 
company which had places for 2 amalova: apparently there were 
actually 5 vacancies, but only two were reserved for amalova. 
This problem needed investigating. At another company a foreman 
had dismissed 13 newly-employed amalova, and hired his own 
people. This would have to be solved.
The third problem was an ongoing one with shop stewards at 
Jabula, who had decided that they would rather fill vacancies 
with their own relatives than with amalova. The executive 
reported meeting with them; the Jabula shop stewards had claimed 
that Amalova was dominated by one man (the full time organiser), 
and that amalova were not interested in the struggle, but simply
2. The meeting was conducted in Zulu, and I was not able to 
understand it all.
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in getting jobs. They gave as an example a work stoppage in which 
the amalova in the factory did not participate.
There was a great deal of audience response to this report. One 
woman who clearly had a lot of political experience, explained to 
the meeting:
This is not a struggle for power or revenge, it is a 
struggle for liberation. We must guide the Jabula shop 
stewards in the right direction.
The executive also reported on meetings with the Unemployed 
Workers' Co-ordinating Committee, to which Amalova is affiliated, 
in Johannesburg.
Under General there was a lengthy argument about the treasurer, 
who was accused by the rest of the executive of failing to attend 
meetings and of going to factories on his own without the 
executive having discussed it. "There is a danger when people go 
alone. We need to know why," said the full time organiser. A 
point was made about financial control.
Woman: You know the rule. You have to be accompanied by 
others. If you get to the factory and they are not there, 
you must turn around and not go in.
Youth: We can't refer to the constitution, because many have 
not seen it. We need justice and peace, not violence. I am 
against expelling the treasurer, (audience approval)
Young ex-union organiser: We are being divided by this 
issue. We can't solve it because we don't know the facts. We 
should elect a committee of neutral people to meet the two 
parties and ascertain the facts.
This was agreed and a committee elected.
The ex-organiser continued: we need to make copies of the 
constitution, circulate them, and have a special meeting to 
discuss it (agreed by the house). We must also organise more 
of the unemployed. Our slogan should be - every unemployed
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an amalova. The unemployed are part and parcel of the 
working class. We need to organise a rally, posters and 
pamphlets. We need to organise street and area committees.
A Fedtraw meeting was advertised, and the ex-organiser suggested 
women should be organised by all means, such as at their weekly 
prayer meetings. A DPSC request for white youths to meet their 
township counterparts was reported, and it was suggested that the 
whites come into the township so that both black and white could 
be shot by the police.
Then the treasurer read out a list of amalova who had been placed 
and had paid their dues of R1 each, and envelopes containing 
money for amalova who had been employed temporarily but had been 
short paid by the company, were handed out.
The executive read out the names for 19 casual jobs, 11 for men 
and 8 for women, for that weekend. The pay was R67 for the two 
days. Many of the people whose names were read out were not 
present, so it took time to finalise the 19.
The meeting ended with an education section. The subject was the 
second clause of the Freedom Charter - "All national groups shall 
have equal rights." It was explained that the authorities had 
divided people by colour in order to create a cheap labour 
reserve; this was linked to unemployment. Such a policy 
maintained control of the economy in white hands, and divided and 
weakened the people. The terms "kaffir", "boesman" and "baas” 
need to be overcome and eradicated from the speech of the people. 
Everyone will have equal rights. Those present must go out and 
teach the people this.
Finally, various slogans of the democratic movement were shouted, 
and the meeting closed with Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika.
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Amalova was started in 1983. Workers at Packers, faced with 
retrenchment, had negotiated with management for setting up a co­
op that would take over the maintenance contract at the factory. 
At about the same time, Raleigh Cycles, which was organised by 
MAWU, retrenched workers. These workers formed Amalova. Amalova 
was important, according to Robert, ex-Raleigh shop steward and 
now organiser for Amalova, because at that time there were many 
retrenchments.
People were saying when they were retrenched that unions are 
the cause of losing their jobs. Rather than people leaving 
the struggle we started this organisation called Amalova. 
When we started this organisation we put postcards here in 
KwaThema asking people to come to a meeting. The postcards 
said even school-leavers can come.
Some school-leavers did come to the meeting. In the meeting 
we talked about politics, things that were affecting the 
community of KwaThema. So they saw, some of them being 
former members of COSAS, that this is the right organisation 
for them, they should stick to it, because it does their 
aims and objects.
Aside from these activists, not many youth participated in 
Amalova until 1985 when it began entering into agreements with 
factories whereby vacancies would be filled by members of the 
organisation. That seems to have been the breakthrough for the 
Amalova, and many people joined, including the youth:
Others who were not coming to our meeting started realising 
this is a good organisation. If you want a job you better go 
to this organisation. When they got inside they realised 
this is an organisation which is going to keep people in the 
struggle. We even give lectures about civics to people who 
don't know anything.
Problems that cut very close to the bone for unemployed workers 
are UIF and furniture repossession. In 1985 the Amalova 
threatened a sleep-in at the Labour Department unless they got 
their UIF money without delay. They did get it. As for furniture
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repossession:
We wrote some letters convening a joint meeting with the 
furniture shops... We told them people bought these things 
because they need these things. And they don't want to lose 
these things. They are prepared to pay but they haven't got 
work. They said people must come and pay at least R30 per 
month. We said that people cannot afford to pay even R2 per 
month because they are not working. We are telling you we 
don't want to see any truck coming to repossess things in 
KwaThema. You cannot repossess a thing of someone who is not 
working. They said they've got a right to repossess if a 
person doesn't pay. We said if you've got a right to 
repossess we've got a right not to sign any paper which you 
bring to us... You are now promoting that people must go and 
steal. We don't want people to steal but we need people to 
survive. If you are fair enough you've got to listen to what 
people are saying. If a person comes after 3 months and pays 
R3 or R4 you've got to accept it because he's not working. 
If you feel a person must pay why don't you hire him in your 
shop so you can deduct from his wages? He must get something 
from you because you've got something.
The furniture shops agreed on that point, that they'll only 
repossess from people who are working, but they won't 
repossess from a person who's not working. We told them if a 
person says they are not working they can check at the 
Labour Dept...
In 1985 the Amalova decided to try getting jobs for people. They 
went to the SSC and told the shop stewards they were going to 
write to management and ask for a ban on overtime and a 40 hour 
week in order to create jobs. Management was not prepared to 
accede, so they went back to the SSC and asked the shop stewards 
to ban overtime as management was not prepared to. The shop 
stewards agreed "to support their brothers" in this way. The 
Amalova would write a letter to a specific management, and at the 
same time the shop stewards would approach management. A meeting 
would then be held with management, Amalova and shop stewards 
present. Agreements were made in a number of companies that 
amalova would be taken for overtime work, and also for casual
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work cleaning factories over the weekends. By January 1986 
Amalova membership stood at 1700. They are not sure of their 
membership at the moment (Robert, 1987a).
At its inception the aim of Amalova, besides keeping retrenched 
workers in the struggle, was to organise co-ops (the Packers co­
op is still the only one they have managed to establish) and take 
up issues affecting the unemployed, such as UIF and pension 
funds, as well as broader community struggles and campaigns. They 
had to elect a new executive in 1984 when the old executive all 
found jobs. Many members felt that this was wrong, since rank- 
and-file members remained without jobs. Robert was prepared to 
stay without a job and was elected to the executive.
Amalova now has agreements with 7 companies, one of which is 
"tricky" because the agreement leaves a gap for recruiting 
workers who are not amalova. The agreement with Jabula is 
threatened because of the attitude of the shop stewards discussed 
above. Letters have been sent to other companies, and meetings 
are being arranged.
The role of the shop stewards is crucial to the success of 
Amalova:
Before we go to management we always approach the shop 
stewards. Then when we meet management we need at least two 
shop stewards to go with us to negotiate with management. If 
management hires somebody without notifying the shop 
stewards and ourselves, the role of the shop stewards is to 
attack management and say, We don't need this somebody 
because we've got an agreement with Amalova. How did you 
hire him? We don't need this somebody here, you better 
contact Amalova.
Organised workers can experience problems with amalova, as the 
Jabula case shows:
We are still teaching people about the struggle, but if he 
gets work he can forget about the struggle because he's not 
used to that thing. We are teaching them that they must be 
used to the struggle.
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But Robert rejected the claim by Jabula shop stewards that 
amalova are scabbing. According to him, amalova who got jobs at 
Jabula joined the union, and two have become shop stewards. 
Moreover, when Jabula workers went on strike they called Amalova 
to come and check whether any of their members were amongst the 
unemployed workers queuing up to take the strikers jobs: none 
were. Robert felt that the real problem is that Jabula shop 
stewards want jobs for their sisters who are not members of 
Amalova.
But Amalova is well aware of the divisions that can exist between 
unemployed and employed workers:
We know exactly about that division. We've already told our 
people if there's a strike they mustn't go there. We've also 
spoken to shop stewards who don't want us to approach their 
management, that one day they'll be on strike, they mustn't 
say we've taken their job, because if we hear that such a 
factory's on strike we are going to phone the bosses and 
say, Look, we've got more than 600 people, how many do you 
need? Now they are realising that if they don't give in to 
us we are a threat to them. But if they don't do that they 
know we'll support them and no-one will take their jobs.
We preach in different locals that, People, if you don't 
want to hear what we say, don't cry tomorrow. Because we 
also need you, if you need us we will help you.
To a question about the relation between retrenched workers and 
youth who have never been employed, Robert gave this answer:
There can be a little division, because the youth always say
3. This point was echoed by Ken, a member of the Packers Amalova 
co-op: "Sometimes people join Amalova to get a job, and when they 
get a job they sell out and don't support the union. It's because 
they are new and don't know about the struggle." (Conversation, 
6.8.87)
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they are pushing the struggle, whereas the organised workers 
who are retrenched are a little bit slower... The youth are 
used to this thing, but there are some times when they take 
the wrong direction, and you have to bring them back to the 
right direction. But they are used, because they were 
members of COSAS.
Some retrenched workers have no understanding, because they were 
never unionised, or because they were passive members of unions.
But we try to shift these things, saying, We are here as a 
team, and we are working as a team. We are going to work 
according to records, not saying this one was working, that 
one was not working.
People fill in membership forms on joining Amalova. Attendance 
records are taken at each of the weekly general meetings. These 
records determine who is eligible for jobs as they come up. If 
someone is absent without a written excuse he or she has to start 
afresh.
To a question about the role of women in Amalova, Robert gave 
this reply:
In fact if a person is capable of leading us, she will lead 
us. We don't say men must take front seat all the time, 
because women can lead us to the light, and men can lead us 
to darkness, because we believe in men.
Amalova is trying to build area structures based on street 
committees, so that each area can discuss "local issues that they 
can tackle", or ideas such as co-ops. They would refer issues or 
ideas to the general meetings for guidance or help. At the 
moment, however, there are only four strongly functioning street 
committees. There seems to be a degree of overlap with structures 
of a civic. Robert agreed that Amalova is in many ways playing 
the role of a civic at present, because of suppression of ERAPO. 
Amalova will take up any issue affecting the community, for 
example school problems. This was echoed by a student congress 
member who explained the importance of attending Amalova 
meetings.
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When the civic is revived, Amalova will send its members to the 
civic, and discuss the issues raised in the civic and then take 
Amalova's decision back to the civic. Both the student and Robert 
emphasised that "in KwaThema we work as a team". All 
organisations encourage their members to attend the meetings of 
other organisation.
Through forming Amalova the workers of Springs have done a great 
deal to overcome the divisions within the working class between 
employed and unemployed workers and, within the ranks of the 
unemployed, between those who have lost their jobs and the youth 
who have never had a job. By combining the latter two groups in 
one organisation they are helping to overcome the conflict that 
so often ravages communities, between politically committed but 
often adventurist youth and their more cautious and often 
conservative elders. While the youth are curbed and disciplined 
by this combination, they can also charge it with their political 
energy.
There can be very real conflicts of interest between employed 
workers and unemployed workers. Amalova has achieved considerable 
success because it has recognised these conflicts and has been 
able to offer the unemployed concrete benefits. It does not only 
try to dissuade the unemployed from scabbing by appealing to a 
higher and idealistic "unity", but it also demands from the 
organised workers that they commit themselves to building Amalova 
by controlling access to jobs at their factories. Thus they are 
building a unity in practice, a unity to which both parties have 
to be actively committed. In at least one factory a form has to 
be signed by shop stewards before a worker can be paid, so it is 
impossible for workers to be employed from outside Amalova. There 
is, in effect, a closed shop (Zakes, 1987b).
Local activists see the role of organising the unemployed and 
"keeping them in the struggle" as politically important, since 
the unemployed are often recruited as vigilantes. It also reduces 
the danger of scabbing, and prevents foremen or indunas from 
recruiting anti-union workers: "If he comes from the Amalova he 
knows about organisation... He joins the union the very first day 
he comes in." One of the aims of Amalova is to start co-ops for
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unemployed workers, but so far the only co-op established is the 
factory maintenance co-op at Packers (Zakes, 1987b, and Robert, 
1987b).
Amalova leadership see the organisation as not simply concerned 
with bread and butter issues, but as very much part of the 
broader struggle. Other organisations are encouraged to attend 
Amalova meetings, and Amalova members are encouraged to join the 
civic and other organisations. Amalova is part of the broader 
democratic struggle, symbolised by the Freedom Charter. The 
struggle against national oppression and for non-racial democracy 
is seen as intimately linked to their position in an exploitative 
economy that cannot provide them with jobs.
3.5 FOSATU AND POLITICS 
Perceptions of FOSATU
All of the people interviewed saw FOSATU as a federation which 
concentrated on shopfloor issues to the exclusion of community or 
political struggles. Shop stewards from Packers discussed their 
involvement in community struggles and in setting up ERAPO:
GEORGE: We were saying there was just no way we could sit 
back and say we are not part and parcel of the thing that 
was being imposed [ ie community councils], that was 
affecting us.
VINCINT: We were also having discussions in FOSATU itself 
about whether it's proper for shop stewards to be involved 
in community organisations. This thing did not start with 
COSATU, it started in FOSATU, whether there is a danger for 
shop stewards to participate in community organisations or 
not. But fortunately in Springs area we found shop stewards 
were participating in whatever actions in the township. In 
other areas the response was poor, even though we had people 
going around, some were involved in Kempton Park right up to 
Pretoria, others to Heidelberg, Nigel. Even though the 
response was poor, people were keen to listen... There were
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problems in other unions where there was that feeling that 
shop stewards cannot participate in other organisations. It 
came to where other unions saw shop stewards from Springs as 
a threat misleading shop stewards in other unions.
GEORGE: I think the comrade is quite correct. Even in our 
own federation we have been attacked by other affiliates 
there, saying the guys from East Rand are moving too fast 
and they are now trying to swing the whole direction into 
politics. I think that was 83-4. Some affiliates were saying 
they don't like the way we are operating. Their argument was 
that if we are saying unions we should specifically 
concentrate on union business. In other words, they were 
saying we were challenging the state and we don't want that 
kind of line as unions.
DAVID: That line was saying we must negotiate wages and 
working conditions, that was union business.
VINCINT: . . . We did have that kind of response here in 
Springs amongst some affiliates, but eventually it faded 
away because they saw it's working, it's a reality, you 
cannot run away from it. Even though I believe in regional 
meetings they were attacked for being party to such 
organisations or actions (Packers shop stewards, 1987. See 
also Zakes 1987a and 1987b; Robert 1987b; Mzwakhe, 1987.
This was put more succinctly by Zakes:
If you remember, in FOSATU we were having no problems, we 
were sleeping at home everyday, no politics. No problem 
(loud laughter) (Zakes, 1987a).
A concrete example of abstention from community struggles was 
given by Mzwakhe. In 1982 the Katlehong SSC was ready to take 
action against shack demolitions. The FOSATU Regional Executive 
"couldn't agree" (or was unable to develop a strategy for taking 
action: Erwin, 1987), so the issue was dropped. The shop stewards 
told the SSC that they had to follow FOSATU structures, so they 
could not accommodate demands to take up the issue. Mzwakhe's 
comment was that for some people
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Workers' control is just a slogan. They talk of mandates, 
but there are no mandates when it suits them (Mzwakhe, 
1987) .
But FOSATU policy was not simply to avoid engaging in community 
struggles. There was a deep mistrust of the tradition of national 
liberation politics in South Africa, and of the organisations 
situated in that tradition:
Moses, a SFAWU official, recalls a seminar held at Wits 
University:
In the Federation the political understanding was that there 
are those populists, and we saw populists as really not 
having the interests of the workers.
In the seminar the ANC and SACTU were "attacked" for their errors 
in the 1950s, and the Freedom Charter was interpreted as being 
similar to the constitution of the PFP (Moses, 1987).
Mzwakhe saw FOSATU policy at the formal level being similar to 
that of COSATU: no political affiliation, provision for 
participation in joint campaigns, and individuals could 
participate in other organisations.
But the interesting aspect was that if you were seen as part 
of broader organisation, or even an organisation like AZAPO, 
they would treat you with suspicion. That was a problem. 
Because their position I do not regard them as 
reactionaries, I simply disagree with their position - was 
that the interests of the class would be submerged in those 
structures, and they would cite SACTU and what what...
FOSATU's position was to form a new party. There was no talk 
of it, but that was the direction...
They would concentrate on wages and conditions, but having a 
hidden agenda, because they would talk about the broader 
political economy, but without actually addressing the 
question of state power. Because once you do that you that
60
you have to come up with a clear position as to how do you 
take over, and how do you relate to the organisations that 
do have such a programme.
The hidden agenda is the workers' party, hence they do not 
address themselves to the question of state power (Mzwakhe, 
1987; see also Zakes, 19876a) (See Chapter 4 for further 
discussion of whether FOSATU had a hidden agenda or whether 
it simply lacked a political agenda).
The development of SFAWU's political position
SFAWU as an affiliate of FOSATU developed a Congress political 
position relatively early on, and then played a important role in 
the development of Congress politics in the federation as a 
whole, and particularly in the Transvaal region. It is therefore 
instructive to analyse the development of this position in the 
union through the eyes of one of its officials, before looking at 
the struggles within the federation.
Moses took a job at a Johannesburg salt factory in 1981, was 
instrumental in organising it into CUSA's Food Beverage Union, 
and then in carrying it into FOSATU's SFAWU because the CUSA 
officials did not attend their meetings. He was dismissed after a 
strike in January 1982, and was then employed by the union as an 
organiser. The union was small at the time, with only 3 factories 
and two other officials. It's base was Springs. Moses had very 
little union experience, and was assisted by the Springs shop 
stewards, particularly those from Packers. They helped with 
negotiations and general meetings.
Organisation improved during 1983, as Moses attended FOSATU 
training courses, and they organised Simba Quix and T.W. Beckett 
in Isando. Moses described their political understanding at the 
time as”not sharp". But in that year the NEC elected Jay Naidoo 
as general secretary, because they needed someone with energy and 
initiative; they also needed internal education. During 1984 a 
number of branch and national seminars were held. Moses referred 
to a national seminar addressed by Curnick Ndlovu and Billy Nair, 
both former SACTU activists who had spent long terms on Robben
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Island. "This motivated our people.
The next major event which deepened the political understanding 
of the union was the Simba strike and boycott in 1984. After the 
dismissals at Simba workers, seeing that they would not win a 
legal case, "challenged the union" to initiate a boycott of Simba 
products. Workers had already been "motivated" by the national 
seminar program, and the Tembisa workers in particular "were part 
of the community organisations and were working closely with 
COSAS".
There was that pressure of the workers on the union to take 
that decision, to support them.
There was support from FOSATU, but it "could not give enough." So 
the union called a meeting with other organisations and unions 
outside FOSATU in order to gain support for the boycott. They did 
this "knowing very well it would not be popular in FOSATU." 
Community organisations and UDF played a major role in mobilising 
the boycott, and campaigning door to door in the coloured area of 
Reiger Park, where the company had recruited scab labour - so 
effectively that "at one stage they just said, Thank you, 
company, we are no longer prepared to scab." These pressures 
resulted in a settlement in the union's favour.
That Simba boycott opened our eyes still further and showed 
the rank and file that once we are working hand in hand with 
other progressive organisations we can go somewhere else.
There was a problem after we had embarked on the boycott. We 
were criticised in the FOSATU Central Committee and regions: 
why do we involve popular organisations? There were 
accusations that workers are no longer in control of the 
boycott, the boycott is in the hands of the populists. There 
was a very heated meeting in Pietermaritzburg where SACOS, 
SACHED and so on were making the very same allegations.
We started to debate these things even in the NEC of SFAWU, 
as to how we should approach these criticisms. We had more 
national seminars. Our members decided the position they had 
adopted of working hand in hand with other progressive
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organisations in the boycott was the right one. We came out 
clearly that this is going to be our position.
According to Moses there was no swamping of workers by 
"populists". In the first place, the Simba workers had initiated 
the whole campaign. There were regular report backs to the forum 
of organisations that had been created, both by the union and the 
workers and by the community and student organisations.
So on that thing of being overcome by populists there was 
nothing. We never saw each other as populists or workers. We 
were equal.
Struggles in FOSATU
It is clear that the formation of the UDF in August 1983, as well 
as the range of popular struggles in the townships during 1984 
and 1985 had an impact on the members of the FOSATU trade unions:
The obvious change was the coming up of the youth, and the 
UDF, which was formed I think in 1983, and the struggles the 
UDF was involved in, calling on all the people in the 
country to be involved, because it was not calling on 
workers who are employed, or who are paying subscriptions to 
the unions, but it was talking about the society, that the 
society should be involved in trying to stop the tricameral 
Parliament in the first place from going ahead. That was in 
line with what the workers were wanting, but they did not 
have an idea about how to go about that, although at the end 
workers felt that they should plug into that sort of 
campaign. We saw FOSATU coming up with some stickers but as 
an independent organisation. It did not work hand in glove 
with other progressive organisations at the time. But as 
that campaign mounted, and other campaigns led you know by 
the students at the time, there was a feeling from the 
workers on the ground that they cannot just leave or observe 
students being killed or students being detained without 
workers being involved, because the very same students /ere 
children of the workers, so we saw workers at the time 
starting to push to form parents organisations in the
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township, where students would also be called in at some 
stage to explain the problems they were having, and workers 
in some areas took this up with management, saying our 
children are being harassed and we are not going to tolerate 
that. So there was no way that people, even those that we 
term workerists, could stop that move from the people.
The campaign against the councillors, and the rent issue, 
took place in the township. That involved the whole of the 
working class. It was not only the people who were 
unemployed who were concerned about this, it was the 
employed as well because rent would be getting very high, 
and the councillors did not try to consult with the people. 
So that campaign was also taken up by the people working and 
the people who were not working, and the community 
organisations, the youth, and all such organisations that 
existed at the time. So that's how the whole thing evolved 
into the position that we see, both in COSATU and in other 
progressive organisations in the country (Zakes, 1987b).
FOSATU did not exactly greet the new political front with 
enthusiasm. Mzwakhe recalls a meeting of shop stewards that UDF 
leaders had been invited to attend:
At that point in time I was pro-affiliation to UDF, and they 
called me a populist. I admit I was mistaken on that point. 
But there was no debate about that. For instance, Popo 
Molefe and Terror Lekota were invited to address a council 
of shop stewards. The meeting was due to start at 1, but the 
shop stewards were called in at 9, to hear a lecture about 
all rubbish about the Freedom Charter. So that when Popo and 
Terror come in, they must be ready to pose questions and 
attack the Freedom Charter and that sort of stuff (Mzwakhe, 
1987) .
This sort of approach did not convince all the shop stewards, 
however. After a meeting of the Transvaal region (possibly the 
same as that attended by Mzwakhe) which was addressed by Molefe 
and Lekota, the Springs shop stewards discussed the UDF in their 
local and decided that if they formed a community organisation it 
could affiliate to UDF, since it was a progressive organisation
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(Vincint, 1987).
The student struggles and boycotts also had a deeply politicising 
effect on the workers. As the PWAWU organiser put it,
...by the growing militancy of the youth and the students 
they [older people] are being forced, because these things 
start right in the family, where a mother meets another 
mother in the street and says, Hey, my son, my daughter told 
me this and this. It's then that people feel they cannot 
take a back seat...
A change can never be brought about by one force because 
there are other forces fighting for the same getting rid of 
oppression. It was then that FOSATU was forced to get 
together with the students... (Nomathemba, 1987; see also 
Zakes, above)
Many workers who started to participate more actively in 
stayaways and community events were influenced to do so by their 
children:
They participate because their children are telling them at 
home. They say, Father, when we have a stayaway you always 
say you're going to work? Why do you not support us? Then 
the father sees, Eh, even my child is like those who are 
doing this. Sometimes one who is not participating finds out 
his child has been arrested. Then he must come to the people 
and say, Can you help me, people, to get my child out. He 
realises now he has made a mistake, because he'll need our 
help. Another goes to work and when he comes back his child 
is shot. Already he is participating, because already they 
shoot his child. When you tell him he must not participate 
in things outside the factory, he'll say, No, they are 
killing our own children. There is a lot of change now. 
About 99% are participating (Robert, 1987b).
Popular struggle against the Community Councils and rent 
increases escalated during 1984 and after, and this contributed 
to the heightened political consciousness in the communities and 
the trade union membership. Virtually every interviewee referred
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to burning grievances against the community councils. No doubt 
the fact that the UDF and its affiliated civics spearheaded the 
campaign increased the standing of these organisations in the 
eyes of the workers.
The popular actions were those that were led by the UDF or 
UDF affiliates, and that in itself drew more people into the 
progressive UDF sector, which was ERAPO because it was 
affiliated to the UDF. All the effective actions were 
organised by the progressives, and this made people feel 
well there is no alternative, this is the organisation of 
the people (Zakes 1987b; see also section 3. 2 above, 
especially Vincint).
The Transvaal stayaway on the 5 and 6 November 1984 was a 
powerful reflection of the political consciousness and anger of 
the workers. Zake's description of how the Transvaal region 
organised the stayaway in FOSATU structures has already been 
quoted. Here he assesses the significance of the stayaway:
Some of you remember 1984 , we saw some shift in FOSATU, we 
saw workers taking a great step forward, starting to meet 
with students, starting to talk with community based 
organisations, starting to get involved in the stayaway... 
In certain quarters of FOSATU that was curbed. It was said 
that was dangerous, certain dangerous people have misled the 
workers into taking part in a stayaway which was called by 
the populist UDF. That started to tell some of the workers 
that there's something wrong in this federation of ours. How 
can people condemn an action that was taken by workers 
demanding that the troops should go out of the townships, 
that the students should be given the right to organise 
themselves in SRCs? How can these people say that was wrong? 
So that started to show people that we need to move to a 
certain side. That added to the shift of some of our people 
(Zakes, 1987a).
In the struggles that developed within FOSATU over political 
direction, the Springs local seems to have played an important 
role (it is beyond the scope of this paper to try to assess the 
role of other locals). In organising for the November stayaway it
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"went out and preached in other locals." According to Vincint, 
the Springs local "was powerful in FOSATU".
Other locals operate differently - they have differences 
between affiliates. We do too, but we work hand in hand - if 
another union has a strike and there is no organiser, we 
will go and help negotiate....
The Springs local was politically advanced because it was 
the first local to work with community organisations. 
Because we had that problem in FOSATU, certain people saying 
we don't have to meet. But we as a local, consisting of 
different affiliates, decide to give it a try. By meeting 
other organisations you gain a lot and they also gain 
something about trade unions.
This unity and common experience in the local also served to 
introduce new ideas into affiliates that were opposed to 
alliances with community organisations. Vincint cited one example 
where the Springs members of a particular affiliate were 
criticised in the affiliate's BEC: "You people from the East are 
always bringing..." (Vincint, 1987).
The PWAWU organiser also remembers Springs as pushing for 
participation in broader community struggles:
There was that sort of opposition to the East Rand in 
particular, because the other areas were not as observant, 
if I can call it, as the East Rand people. I am not quite 
sure why...
Other areas were less observant... FOSATU was concentrating 
on a strong shopfloor, I think people at that time were just 
concentrating on that, and not thinking as to why do I have 
to wake up and go to work every morning... (Nomathemba, 
1987)
The Springs members of SFAWU see their union as playing a key 
role in the struggle within FOSATU to push for closer links with 
community organisations and, later, to assert a congress position 
inside the federation. This was evident in the way they lobbied
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for the 1984 stayaway. But the position of SFAWU is perhaps best 
highlighted by their role in re-opening the unity talks to the 
UDF-affiliated unions in 1985.
According to Moses SFAWU motivated an extended regional meeting 
of all shop stewards in the Transvaal to discuss politics and 
unity. At the meeting SFAWU motivated that the UDF unions be 
invited to come to a meeting and explain whether they had any 
problems with the 5 principles laid down by the Feasibility 
Committee. There was some resistance, with people claiming that 
the UDF unions "were only involved in politics, they've got no 
membership on the ground" (Zakes, 1987a), but in the end the 
meeting agreed. "We pushed FOSATU to open its doors again." 
(Moses, 1987) SFAWU also lobbied in the various SSCs in the 
Transvaal. "Springs was no problem, Katlehong accepted, Kempton 
Park accepted, the problem was with Johannesburg and Benoni."
(Zakes, 1987a).
The Transvaal decision was taken to the FOSATU Central Committee, 
which did not object, and then to a meeting of all the 
Feasibility Committee unions. "There we were taken to task" for 
changing the position of the Feasibility unions, but none the 
less the decision was accepted (Zakes, 1987a). Thus the 
groundwork was laid for the Ipelageng meeting where the 
Feasibility unions, the UDF unions, as well as CUSA and AZACTU 
met to discuss the new federation. The outcome was a new unity of 
Feasibility and UDF unions, with CUSA and AZACTU withdrawing to 
form their own federation.
So the Transvaal region won the battle on that day....
In actual fact it was the SFAWU people who initiated the
move and started to caucus other unions (ibid).
SFAWU had motivated to reopen the talks because they believed the 
exclusion of other unions would defeat the purpose of the whole 
project, because it would leave numbers of workers outside and 
result in rival federations. This would result in demarcation 
issues, and difficulties in negotiating nationally (Zakes, 1987a 
and 1987b; Moses 1987).
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We also argued that we were involved in struggles in the 
townships, not as union members but as members of the 
community, and some of the people we work with are members 
of SAAWU and other general unions, and to leave these people 
out is not going to work to our favour... (Zakes, 1987b)
Many SFAWU militants also felt that the political position of the
UDF unions was close to their own, and so wanted them in the new
federation (Vincint, 1987).
Zakes explained the significance of this development to his
comrades in FAWU:
You must understand that you are marrying two tendencies, 
that of the radicals and that of the workerists to some 
extent. A correct line will always come out to be correct. 
That is why there is a debate now about whether to adopt the 
Freedom Charter or not. That was a tendency practised 
amongst the UDF unions... You can see this other [workerist] 
tendency being narrowed down, because some of the unions 
within this [Feasibility ] grouping are starting to move 
towards this line that was practised by the radicals. We 
started to see SFAWU moving in that direction. At one stage 
it was almost kicked out of the federation. We started to 
see a shift of the majority of unions which represented the 
workerist view.
Now because that view was not shared by the workers, it was 
shared by certain individuals, specially intellectuals, it 
is shrinking now. People are moving towards the left...
What is interesting is that the resolutions that were 
adopted at the COSATU launch, they are more towards the 
left. People started to ask, how did it come that we adopted 
these resolutions, because these resolutions mean we are 
fighting for the liberation of the people rather than jobs 
and wages (laughter).
That is how our federation called COSATU was formed, 
comrades (Zakes, 1987a).
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The interviews show that a number of factors combined to produce 
the political shift within the union movement that is expressed 
at the formal level in the different political positions of 
FOSATU and COSATU.
Firstly, there was the impact of the intensifying political 
struggle in the country, which began with the formation of the 
UDF and its campaigns against the Tricameral Parliament and the 
Black Local Authorities, and combined with the school boycotts 
which spread nationally through 1984, to culminate in community 
uprisings on a national scale with a depth never before seen in 
South Africa.
The UDF was able to capture the national imagination and build a 
popular unity both ideologically and organisationally in a way 
that was quite simply beyond the scope of trade unions. Zakes 
captures the difference between a trade union and a political 
organisation very clearly when he describes a union as speaking 
for its members or for workers with jobs, whereas the UDF was 
"calling on all the people to be involved... it was talking about 
the society..." The involvement of UDF in national campaigns as 
well as local struggles and organisations, in providing 
leadership as well as back up resources, rapidly placed it in a 
hegemonic political position.
Since FOSATU's attempt to provide a political alternative to the 
Congress tradition had nothing to offer beyond trade unionism and 
therefore could not contest the terrain of national opposition 
politics, its membership turned to UDF for political leadership. 
Although the federation tried to maintain its distance, running a 
parallel anti-Tricameral campaign rather than a joint campaign 
with the UDF, this position was increasingly out of joint with 
the feelings of the membership.
The mass struggles against rent increases, against communi ty 
councils, and most importantly in support of the students, their 
children, obviously affected and involved workers deeply and made 
these political questions of burning importance. Workers had 
their own fighting organisations at the workplace, and they saw 
no reason why these should be isolated from all the other 
fighting organisations that were struggling against oppression.
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At a more institutional level one can see the role of the SSC' s 
and of the more Congress-sympathetic unions such as SFAWU in 
capturing the political mood and anger of the rank and file, and 
engaging in a struggle within FOSATU over its political 
direction, firstly in relation to the 1984 stayaway, and then in 
reopening the unity talks to the UDF unions. By the time COSATU 
was formed the Congress position was clearly dominant, supported 
by some of the former FOSATU affiliates such as SFAWU, as well as 
by UDF unions and, crucially, by the biggest union in the new 
federation, NUM. These unions were probably not only expressing 
the political feelings of their members, but also finding echoes 
amongst the membership of the unions whose leadership was more 
sceptical about the Congress tradition.
An anecdote related by Moses captures this point:
Other unions showed no remarkable change. But we were 
encouraging workers to lead on these issues. When debating 
it workers from other unions would simply understand it. For 
instance, there was a group that went overseas, and they had 
to make a report back at a large regional meeting of shop 
stewards. Discussing the very same thing of populism and 
workerism. One of the shop stewards from that group reported 
that, No, we have met those people in London, SACTU and ANC 
are just a bunch of communists and under communist control, 
you see? That person was shouted down, really. Even shop 
stewards from other unions came out straightforward and 
said, No, we are the ANC, and so on. We realised that what 
we see as the union policy at times is not a reflection of 
the members. That was in 1985, just before the meeting at 
Ipelageng. Some decisions were taken that we must instruct 
FOSATU to go and meet ANC and SACTU because already some 
businessmen had gone there. There was also a mandate that 
the UDF unions be part of the new federation (Moses, 1987).
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that the changing political 
position from FOSATU to COSATU was not the simple result or 
reflection of a changed political mood amongst the membership. It 
was the outcome of a conscious struggle on the part of union 
activists and structures with a Congress political position
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against other activists and structures opposed to the Congress 
position (of course the climate of political struggle had 
resulted in many leading workers and officials adopting a 
Congress political position). Because of the national context of 
intense and violent community and political struggles, the 
Congress activists and structures were able to capture the 
heightened political consciousness of the membership and express 
it in a coherent political position.
The story of these struggles also clarifies the point that trade 
unions are not simply working class organisations that directly 
express working class interests and consciousness because of 
their location in the relations of production. Trade unions are 
themselves sites of struggle, a contested terrain of 
organisational and ideological practices. Trade unions do not 
simply express the consciousness of their members. They are 
organisations with shopfloor, local, regional and national 
structures, and the representatives, office-bearers and officials 
at each level are likely to have different experiences, training, 
interests, and ideas, and be subject to differing pressures and 
forces.^ These structures constitute a complex organisational 
terrain of struggle over political ideology and practices. I will 
return to this point later, since it has important theoretical 
implications. 4
4. Several of my interviewees made the point that there is a 
distinction between shop stewards and membership. See Mzwakhe, 
7.8.87; Robert, 7.8.87; Vincint, 6.8.87.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF THREE FOSATU POSITION PAPERS
In this chapter I will analyse some of the position papers about 
the role of trade unions in political struggle that emerged from 
FOSATU in written form over the years. In South Africa most of 
the debate and argument about theory and strategy take place in 
oral form, and rarely find their way into print (which is why the 
previous chapter, based on oral interviews, is so important). 
Those debates that do find their way into print are not a direct 
expression of struggle and debate on the ground, since they often 
come from an intellectual leadership which is more or less 
distant from the base. Moreover, security considerations mean 
that arguments are often presented in an elliptical or ambiguous 
way.
None the less, printed position paper are important, since they 
can reveal the theoretical and strategic concerns of the 
leadership, and these concerns do exert a powerful influence over 
the positions and strategies of the organisations they lead.
4.1 Joe Forster's (General Secretary) keynote address to the 
1982 FOSATU Congress
This speech was seen as a major policy document, and was adopted 
by the congress. Before analysing the document itself, it is 
necessary to place it in its organisational and political 
context.
The 1982 Congress occurred at a time when unions, in contrast to 
the late 1970s, were not simply struggling to survive, but had 
established their right to exist. Legislation which followed the 
Wiehahn Commission in 1979 laid down procedures for registration
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and recognition of trade unions. Between 1979 and 1982 FOSATU's 
membership increased from 37 000 to 90 000. By 1983 the 
democratic trade unions had approximately 6000 shop stewards. 
Also by 1983 there were a total of 406 signed agreements with 
companies (of which 285 were with FOSATU affiliates) compared to 
5 in 1979, and a total of 756 workplaces organised. The growing 
confidence of the working class was reflected in the fact that 
1982 saw the highest number of strikes since the Second World War 
(Maree, 1986: 8-10).
But the increased strength and confidence of the trade union 
movement was paralleled by the development of new political 
forces and the re-emergence of old ones. This placed new 
pressures on the trade unions. The first sign of the tensions 
this would entail was the breakaway from FOSATU's affiliate, 
United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers' Union (UAW), of the 
Ford Cortina plant in Port Elizabeth in 1979. The dispute began 
when workers at the plant struck in support of a colleague who 
had been dismissed because his duties as president of PEBCO, a 
local black community organisation, entailed a great deal of 
absenteeism from work. The workers later left UAW, charging that 
it was too close to management and that it was unsympathetic to 
community struggles and organisations (SALB, 6, 2 & 3; Friedman, 
1987: 188ff).
1979 also saw the Food and Canning Workers Union initiating a 
boycott of Fattis and Monis products in alliance with a range of 
community, sporting and traders organisations, as part of a 
campaign for reinstatement of dismissed strikers. After 7 months 
the campaign succeeded in its demands (Friedman, 1987: 187-8). 
The following year Western Province General Workers' Union 
organised a red meat boycott in support of striking members. The 
boycott gained massive community support, coming as it did in the 
middle of militant community struggles around education and 
transport, but it was did not succeed in reinstating workers 
(WPGWU, 1980).
All of these unions, as well as the general unions that grew 
rapidly in 1980-82, and which saw themselves as part of the 
congress tradition (they would later affiliate to the UDF) were 
highly critical of FOSATU's workerism, its abstention from
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community struggles. Aside from these developments in the union 
movement, the congress tradition of popular politics was 
beginning to re-emerge inside the country, in the form of the 
Release Mandela Campaign, the anti-SA Indian Council campaign, 
and other organisations and struggles.
Thus it was that, at its 1982 Congress, FOSATU was under pressure 
to spell out its political position and its relation to the 
developing political and community movement. Joe Forster's 
keynote address was an attempt to do just that. It is not an easy 
document to summarise, because it is often couched in vague, 
ambiguous and abstract terms. However, I shall begin by quoting 
Forster's own summary:
1. That worker resistance such as strike action helps build 
worker organisation but by itself does not mean that there 
is a working class movement.
2. There has not been and is not a working class movement in 
South Africa.
3. The dominant political position in South Africa is that 
of the popular struggle against an oppressive, racist 
minority regime.
4 . That this tradition is reasserting itself in the present 
upsurge of political activity.
5. However, the nature of economic development has brutally 
and rapidly created a large industrial proletariat.
6. That the size and development of this working class is 
only matched by its mirror image, which is the dramatic 
growth and transformation of industrial capital.
7 . That before it is too late workers must strive to form 
their own powerful and effective organisation within the 
wider popular struggle (Forster, 1982: 78).
Forster takes the labour movements of the advanced capitalist 
countries as his model for a "working class movement", and then 
draws the conclusion that South Africa does not and never has had 
a working class movement (ibid: 69-71). This is clearly an 
"illegitimate analytical method of imposing ready made, 
extraneous and historicist models onto the concrete South African 
reality", ("The workers struggle": 2) the consequence of which 
is to prevent any consideration of the significance of the
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national question for the working class movement in South Africa.
The imposition of the labour movements of advanced bourgeois 
democracies as a model for South Africa also demonstrates a 
fundamental political ambiguity. Forster does not discuss the 
ideology, politics or organisational structures of the labour 
movements he holds up as a model. He does not raise the question 
of reformism and socialism. Is he posing the reformist politics 
of the British labour movement, for example, as a model for the 
South African working class? He does not ask the question as to 
why such labour movements have failed to pose a fundamental 
challenge to capitalism. Has this failure got anything to do with 
their narrow 'labourism', their inability to link up with wider 
popular struggle, their inability to throw off their image as 
part of the 'established order', and win legitimacy as a leading 
force for social change? As I shall show, a number of the 
formulations of FOSATU's leadership imply - if only by default - 
a reformist, gradualist approach to politics.
The silence on these points signals a fundamental problem that we 
shall see surfacing in each of the position papers analysed here 
- a dislocation between the trade union movement and politics, an 
inability to specify the relation of trade unions - or the 
working class more generally - to political struggle.
This dislocation between politics and economics runs through 
Forster's speech. In the sphere of politics, there is a populist 
struggle, headed by the ANC, against the apartheid regime. In the 
economy, there is a working class struggle against capital.
Workers and their struggle became very much part of a wider 
popular struggle. An important effect of this development 
was that capital could hide behind the curtains of apartheid 
and racism...
Capital did its very best to keep in the political 
background and as a result this helped prevent the creation 
of capital's logical political opposite, which is a working 
class political movement...
...behind the scenes of the great battle between the
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apartheid regime and its popular opponents... the capitalist 
economy has flourished and capital emerges now as a powerful 
and different force...
So there is a growing gap between popular politics and the 
power of capital and as a result the potential power of 
workers...
In the economy capital and labour are the major forces, yet 
politically the struggle is being fought elsewhere... 
(Forster, 1987: 72-4).
Our concern is with the very essence of politics, and that 
is the relation between capital and labour (ibid: 83).
In these passages capital and the state seem to have no relation 
to each other. The struggle against the state (apartheid) is 
something completely different from the working class struggle 
against capital. Capital hides "behind the curtains", in the 
"background",or "behind the scenes". The moment workers take part 
in the broader struggle they cease struggling against capital, 
which can then conceal itself elsewhere. Working class 
participation in the struggle against apartheid has no potential 
for deepening the anti-apartheid struggle into an anti-capitalist 
struggle; on the contrary, it immediately dissipates workers 
amongst the people. The struggle against the state is by its 
nature populist and cannot take on an anti-capitalist dynamic:
All the great and successful popular movements have had as 
their aim the overthrow of oppressive - most often colonial 
- regimes . But these movements cannot and have not in 
themselves been able to deal with the particular and 
fundamental problems of workers (my emphasis) (ibid: 77).
This is a surprising statement, ignoring as it seems to do, 
popular socialist revolutions in Cuba, Vietnam, China, 
Yugoslavia, Nicaragua, amongst others.
But more particularly, it demonstrates the a priorism of the 
workerist argument that the liberation movement in South Africa 
is populist. It is clear that their assessment of the South
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African liberation movement will not be based on a concrete 
analysis of its composition, history and programme, but on an a 
priori judgement that all popular movements are populist. Such a 
priori judgements prevent Forster from a concrete analysis of the 
potential for "a serious attempt to build on those traditions and 
practices of ANC open to the development of a working class 
perspective" ("The workers struggle": 10).
It is noteworthy that South Africa's capitalists did not share 
Forster's assessment of the popular movement in the 1950s: far 
from the capitalist economy flourishing "behind the scenes of the 
great battle between the apartheid regime and its popular 
opponents",' the economy stagnated during much of the 1950s and 
went into shock in 1960 when Sharpville and the resulting 
explosion of popular anger triggered a massive outflow of 
capital. It was the smashing of the popular movement that 
restored investor confidence and paved the way for the economic 
boom of the 1960s.
Forster's argument is based on a very superficial conception of 
what political activity consists of:
In the present context all political activity, provided it 
is anti-state, is of equal status. In the overall resistance 
to this regime, this is not necessarily incorrect. In fact, 
without such unity and widespread resistance it would not be 
possible by means of popular mass movements to seriously 
challenge the legitimacy of the present regime (Forster, 
1982: 76).
There are two problems here. Firstly, popular politics has been 
reduced to a struggle for legitimacy, and it is this overriding 
need for "legitimacy" that makes it impossible for the political 
movement to explore questions of socialism. Forster does not 
regard political activity as essentially a struggle for power (of 
which one element is the struggle for legitimacy) at all levels 
from the local to the national . The second problem is that 
Forster assumes that class forces do not exist outside the 
economy, in the realm of popular struggle against the state. It 
is precisely because popular struggle is a struggle for power 
that it raises all the questions about strategy, ideology and
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organisation which are, at least in part, class-questions, and 
which are struggled over within the popular movement.
This analysis of politics produces Forster's puzzling ambivalence 
towards the liberation movement. On the one hand the mass 
mobilisation achieved by the Congress Alliance was "essential", a 
"great task" and the ANC "rose to be one of the great liberation 
movements in Africa." On the other hand, these organisations 
threaten to "hijack" the workers' struggle and "swamp" the 
workers, and "in the end will have no option but to turn against 
their worker supporters." (ibid: 77)
Forster's analysis makes it impossible to specify what the 
working class alternative to populism is, because he has defined 
all politics, ie. anti-state struggle, as populist. Thus, he 
complains that, while capital and labour are the major forces in 
the economy, the political struggle is taking place "elsewhere". 
It is difficult to imagine how the political struggle could take 
place in the economy, since political struggle involves struggle 
against the state which is manifestly not the same thing as the 
economy. If working class political struggle is to consist of the 
direct political struggle between capital and labour, then it can 
only consist of trade union struggle - an economistic or 
syndicalist position based on class reductionism. I
I would argue that if the working class is absent from the 
political struggle that is because it is isolated in its trade 
unions and not contesting the terrain of political struggle. It 
seems to me that Forster's statement that the "essence of 
politics" is "the relation between capital and labour” is quite 
simply wrong; if it is true, then it is only true at such a high 
level of abstraction that it can provide no guide for political 
strategy: the essence of politics is concretely the relation 
between the people and the state, and it is around this 
contradiction that strategies have to be developed.*
In the end it is not quite clear what Forster is talking about at
1. See Laclau, 1977, for a discussion of popular struggle and the 
contradiction between the people and the ruling block.
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the level of practical strategy. He argues that
FOSATU must set itself the task of giving leadership and 
direction to the building of a working class movement...
FOSATU as a trade union federation will clearly not 
constitute the working class movement, nor would this place 
FOSATU in opposition to the wider political struggle or its 
major liberation movement.
FOSATU's task will be to build the effective organisational 
base for workers to play a major political role as workers" 
(Forster 1982: 78). .
There is a degree of ambiguity here about whether the trade union 
movement is to constitute the organisational base for a working 
class movement, or whether Forster is contemplating FOSATU giving 
birth to a specifically political organisation. But the practical 
tasks outlined in his paper are concerned with building the 
powerful industrial unions of FOSATU, as the real base for 
workers to develop their strength, and from which they can then 
intervene in community politics. Without such a base "we will 
destroy a clear worker identity since workers will be entirely 
swamped by the powerful tradition of popular politics." (ibid: 
82) This means, then, that trade unions are the organisational 
source for a real working class politics. This is of course the 
logical conclusion to be drawn from his analysis of politics and 
populism, capital and the state. As an anonymous critique of his 
speech argues, Forster does not address the question of state 
power, and ultimately implies a deferral of alliances and "a 
retreat into trade unionism" ("The workers struggle": 9).
Such a position rests on a class essentialism which "assumes that 
left to themselves the trade unions will naturally and 
unproblematica1ly adopt a "real" proletarian politics, will 
arrive at an undiluted "revolutionary” position which is somehow 
naturally imprinted on the working class." (ibid: 10) It is the 
same class essentialism which lies behind the argument that the 
labour movements of the advanced capitalist countries constitute 
a model of a working class movement, without examining what the 
political content of that movement is. Precisely the struggles
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within FOSATU that I explore in Chapter 3 reveal the falseness of 
such a class essentialism, showing as they do that the political 
identity of trade unions is the subject of struggle, and that it 
can in fact be constituted in a number of different ways.
Forster states that FOSATU's tasks "will contribute to the wider 
liberation struggle" rather than placing FOSATU "in opposition 
to the wider political struggle or its major liberation 
movement." (Forster, 1982: 78) But since he nowhere indicates 
how the working class movement could contribute to the wider 
struggle or relate to the ANC, but rather stresses the dangers 
and pitfalls of any link with "populism", this can be regarded as 
rhetoric which was probably necessary in order to reassure his 
audience that FOSATU was not opposed to the liberation movement. 
Several of the interviews quoted in Chapter 1 support the view 
that FOSATU was in fact opposed to SACTU and the ANC.
It is not my intention here to discuss the problems with 
Forster's version of the history of the ANC and SACTU in the 
1950s. Suffice to say that his a priori definition of the nature 
of "populist" politics makes his judgement that SACTU and the 
working class were subordinated to petty bourgeois interests 
inevitable.
4.2 Unity in the struggle? - paper by Alec Erwin, FOSATU 
Education Secretary (1985)
This paper, delivered to the 1985 ASSA Conference and published 
later that year in SA Labour Bulletin, is essentially an attempt 
to come to grips with "liberation politics", which had developed 
so rapidly in the country since Forster's 1982 speech, and with 
its relation to "transformation politics".
More specifically, the government's Tricameral Parliament 
reforms, and the formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 
to oppose these, had placed politics firmly on the agenda. The 
UDF campaigns, and the intensifying popular struggles of 1984-5 
had demonstrated the durability and appeal of the congress
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tradition, as well as the seriousness of its activists and their 
organisational and political abilities. Despite - or maybe 
because of - the fact that the trade union movement was close to 
achieving new unity in a 'super-federation' and thus would have 
even more industrial and political weight, the political 
developments within the country had increased the political 
pressure on the trade unions, both from within and without their 
structures, to clarify their position in relation to the 
country's political crisis in general, and the liberation 
movement in particular (some of the pressures are discussed in 
Chapter 2).
The immediate background to Erwin's paper was the Transvaal 
stayaway of November 5 and 6, 1984. The stayaway was co-ordinated 
by the Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee, representing the 
Transvaal region of FOSATU, the Council of Unions of South 
Africa, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), community 
and youth organisations, and the Release Mandela Committee. It 
was thus an unprecedented display of joint co-ordination and 
action, and led to heightened debate as well tensions over the 
role of trade unions in popular resistance (LMG, 1985; and 
Chapter 3 above).
A shift is apparent between Forster's and Erwin's papers. The 
liberation movement is treated with more respect, and Erwin's 
recognition of the importance of the liberation struggle is less 
rhetorical, more real than Forster's. He acknowledges the central 
role of this struggle in South Africa. But his analysis of 
liberation politics shows exactly the same flaws as Forster's.
Erwin uses the same "illegitimate analytical method" as Forster, 
drawing up three ahistorical models of national liberation 
struggle, "national defence", "nation-building" and "populism".
These forms impose upon political activity certain 
imperatives and shape the basis for mobilising mass 
support... and [the] programme of mobilisation in general 
terms (Erwin, 1985: 54).
Erwin deduces from his definition of these forms that the 
programme in all three cases must be precisely maximum unity and
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the suppression of class interests. This is an entirely 
ahistorical and non-materialist approach to the problem, 
preventing a concrete analysis of the forces and relations that 
constitute the national liberation movement, and of its history 
and programme. Erwin ignores, (as does Forster) the variety of 
national struggles in our century in which the working class has 
won the leading role, a point which is made by Cronin (1986: 30).
Erwin argues that liberation struggle is characterised by the 
need to gain maximum unity in opposition to the regime within the 
country, (Erwin, 1985: 54ff) and to win legitimacy for the 
movement's efforts in the international arena (ibid: 57ff). Both 
of these imperatives demand that the liberation movement suppress 
class differences and avoid "debates and practices related to the 
transformation of the economy and society" (ibid: 55).
Thus it is inevitable that national liberation or popular 
struggle takes a populist form that denies class differences and 
erases the issues of socialist transformation from the political 
agenda. Erwin recognises the necessity for liberation struggle, 
but poses the problem that it excludes a struggle for socialist 
transformation. One notes here precisely the same theoretical 
dead end as that created by Forster. Liberation struggle is a 
priori populist because it is concerned with international 
legitimacy and domestic unity.
One might ask, if this is the case, how it is possible for any 
socialist struggle to succeed, since the overthrow of any regime 
would appear to require unity amongst the people and isolation of 
the regime. Erwin's answer is that where liberation struggle 
assumes a military form the need on the part of the guerrillas to 
maintain a voluntary support base amongst the peasantry requires 
"practices that address the whole problem of transforming 
society." (ibid: 56) But he sees little comparability with South 
Africa (ibid: 68).
Like Forster, Erwin has an extremely limited conception of what 
political struggle entails. Liberation politics is "in essence an 
attack on the legitimacy and authority of the ruling regime 
and... will in large part be fought out in the international 
arena." (ibid: 59) Like Forster, he fails to conceptua1ise
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political struggle as a struggle for power at all levels, and 
that this entails building organisation and developing strategies 
and ideologies that do necessarily raise questions of class and 
transformation. Jeremy Cronin, at the time Education Officer for 
the Western Cape region of the UDF, makes precisely this point in 
his response to Erwin's paper. After giving several examples from 
the rich variety of popular struggle that developed in the 1984/5 
period, Cronin concludes that
...transformation politics can, and has emerged from the 
impetus of liberation politics. They do not belong to two 
irreconcilable tracks, forever presenting us with a dilemma 
(Cronin, 1986: 36).^
Cronin argues that the populist unity regarded by Erwin as 
inseparable from popular struggle, is dangerous:
It is a dangerous, undialectical error to imagine that the 
cause of unity runs counter to an understanding and 
articulation of differences within that unity... such unity 
requires an understanding of both the unifying interests as 
well as the crucial class and strata differences within the 
people's camp.
Cronin also notes that
Common interests are not all political, and the divergent 
interests are not all economic in a popular multi-class 
alliance (ibid: 32-3).
Erwin's proposed strategy for putting transformation on the 
agenda is to build democratic organisation in workplace and 
community. In addition, problems of transformation need to be 
addressed in the spheres of culture, health, education, 
engineering, science, administration, technology. He concludes 2
2. The same point emerges from the story of the struggles in 
KwaThema, told in Chap. 3. The massive political mobilisation 
that took place in 1984/5 develops multiple forms of democratic 
mass-based organisation which pose issues of transformation.
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that
Unity must now be based on the politics of transformation 
that will secure the interests of the working class and 
rural population. It must address the problems of the 
economy and evolve practices that will establish the basis 
for transformation. This requires analysis and debate so as 
to locate the nature of alliances. It also requires 
acceptance of the centrality of the working class (Erwin, 
1985: 70).
This is a startling conclusion, since the previous 20 pages of 
the paper had been at pains to prove that liberation politics 
excludes the possibility of transformation politics, but that 
liberation politics is necessary for any challenge to the regime. 
Does this mean that Erwin is suggesting liberation politics be 
abandoned in favour of transformation politics? If so what 
becomes of the struggle for state power, or the struggle for 
popular unity and international legitimacy? Or does it mean two 
parallel struggles, a liberation struggle against apartheid, and 
a transformation struggle in the economy and society? Erwin's 
paper is utterly silent on this score. His solution, therefor, 
remains idealistic and abstract, offering no practical political 
direction to the strategic choices facing the trade union 
movement.
It is revealing that both Forster and Erwin define liberation 
politics almost solely in terms of a struggle for legitimacy, 
while legitimacy appears to have nothing to do with 
transformation politics. But surely the central strategic issue 
in the struggle for transformation is the struggle of the working 
class and its close allies - ie. the forces for transformation - 
to win a position of leadership over the popular struggle as a 
whole - precisely to establish their legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of socialism as an alternative to capitalism. The 
struggle to win popular legitimacy for transformation is 
precisely one that can only take place within the framework of 
national political life and the popular struggle that occupies 
centre stage. It cannot be won by withdrawing the working class 
from national struggle, or running a transformation struggle 
parallel to liberation struggle. The working class has to
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demonstrate that it is the only class capable of organising and 
leading the nation to thoroughgoing liberation. This is the real 
struggle for legitimacy - or hegemony - in a national liberation 
struggle. Of course, the struggle for the other kind of 
legitimacy - legitimacy in the international arena - is a key 
component of any liberation struggle, but there is nothing 
inherent in this that imposes a suppression of the problems of 
transformation.
4.3 "Discussion paper - March 1986"
This was a discussion paper circulated in COSATU as a response to 
a discussion paper produced by SFAWU just before the launch of 
COSATU (in November 1985), and to the political position taken up 
by the new federation. Specifically, the writer was alarmed by a 
statement made by the newly elected President of COSATU at its 
launching rally, to the effect that unless the government 
abolished the pass laws within 6 months COSATU would launch an 
anti-pass campaign. This threat was made without any mandate. 
Likewise, the writer was alarmed by the action of the newly- 
elected general secretary of the federation in meeting the ANC 
while at a meeting of the World Council of Churches in Harare and 
issuing a statement, again without a formal mandate. These were 
indications of a dangerous ascendancy of 'populism.'
This paper has the virtue, in comparison to Forster's and 
Erwin's, of being concrete and explicit, and therefore easier to 
discuss. It is also less sympathetic to the liberation movement, 
being openly hostile to all forces outside the union movement. 
The differences notwithstanding, it suffers from the same 
theoretical and strategic problems as the previous two papers.
The earlier SFAWU paper had argued that the recent period of mass 
political struggle demonstrated that it was "imperative that 
workers seek alliances with other classes and organisations." 
(SFAWU, 1985: 4) The anonymous response opened by discussing the 
dangers of populism in the new federation, which threatened to 
destroy democracy and lay the unions open to external control. It 
noted the struggles around the unity talks, and argued that the
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UDF unions had been neutralised by the democratic structures of 
COSATU and by their absorption into the larger industrial unions.
The paper went on to caution against "complacency" in the face 
of the dangers of populism. As with Forster and Erwin, the writer 
characterises populism as necessarily inimical to the interests 
of the working class. It is characterised by "a recklessness 
about the very notion of order and control" and leads to a 
"destabilisation of township life" ("Discussion paper": 3). 
Populist leaders are demogogues who are neither elected nor 
accountable, subject to no control or discipline (ibid: 6).
. . . this brand of politics has a very limited capacity for 
self-criticism or self-discipline. Without the necessary 
organisational structures it has a very limited capacity to 
develop democratic organisational practices (ibid: 8).
As with Erwin, the nature of the political circumstances 
determines that political activity will have these 
characteristics:
Populism is an inevitable political response in the 
circumstances at present. To ignore the factors giving rise 
to a massive upsurge in populist politics is as mistaken as 
to ignore the undirected, erratic and undisciplined 
political actions that are all too easily a part of populism 
(ibid: 4).
The writer criticises SFAWU for arguing that unions need to enter 
into alliances and so ensure that "the politics of the working 
class becomes the politics of the entire people." SFAWU 
misunderstands "the very nature of populist politics" (ibid: 7) - 
"populist politics is not 'governable' through intervention." 
The writer gives an interesting example of what he/she means:
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Let us analyse the conduct of worker leaders in the recent 
consumer boycotts of white shops.^
They do not suggest in a meeting of township residents that 
we should end the boycott - it is only traitors to the 
struggle that make such suggestions. They do not stand up as 
leaders and propose disciplinary action to be taken against 
a comrade who has proved himself to be an overzealous 
'cowboy' in the course of the campaign - only fools who 
don't mind their houses being burned down make such 
suggestions. They don't stand up and draw attention to the 
fact that the local traders in the township have not 
significantly lowered their prices and as a result are 
getting fatter, richer and wealthier on the continuation of 
the consumer boycott by the day.
On the contrary, they JOIN the populist leadership.
Despite the rhetoric about socialism and the need for 
working class aims and objectives... the practices and 
statements of such leadership constantly compromises the 
politics and organisational practices of the working class. 
Far from widening the terrain of class politics, such 
attempts to govern the ungovernable simply neutralise the 
workers as a class in their 'communities' (ibid: 7).
This makes an interesting contrast to Vincint's description of 
the boycott organised in KwaThema in response to the state of 
emergency, in Chapter 3, above. There the organisers did call the 
boycott off when it threatened to be divisive, and they also 
managed to ensure the co-operation of the local traders.
The fact that something like a consumer boycott can have 
different forms, depending on how it is organised, illustrates 
the point that the writer does not actually define populism, nor 
show why it is so inevitably the form that anti-apartheid 
politics must take. Ultimately it appears that he/she is not 3
3. Presumably this refers to incidents in Natal, since the paper 
originated from that province.
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talking specifically about populist politics, but that all anti- 
state politics is necessarily ungovernable. There is here a 
profound fear of and hostility towards all popular political 
struggle. Perhaps Parliamentary politics is orderly enough not to 
be 'populist', but then it is hardly working class politics.
The writer fears that
locking ourselves into structures with unstructured 
organisations as a basis for action could drag us into each 
and every adventurous action... the new alliance will not 
recognise when confrontationist practices are exhausting our 
unions rather than the state, (writers emphasis) (ibid: 8).
The writer argues that the only way forward is for COSATU to 
strengthen the SSCs and clarify their role. The SSCs should be 
the vehicle for engaging in community struggles.
We need to address ourselves to the ongoing problems in the 
townships and develop projects to assist such communities on 
an ongoing basis. In short, we need to ORGANISE in 
townships... unions need to develop the same capacity [to 
lead workers] in areas where workers live...
Such projects can
co-operate with other community organisations that are 
supportive of any programme on which we are working. 
Crucially, however, our right and ability to act on our own 
and in accordance with those principles... of democratic 
worker-controlled shop floor based industrial unions must 
remain the cornerstone of our practices...
It is in this way that we retain prospects of actively 
promoting class politics and the independence of the 
working class (ibid: 10).
The writer fetishises shopfloor organisation as the only 
appropriate form of organisation for the working class - to such 
an extent that he/she sees the shopfloor as the base for taking 
up community issues, rather than building organisation in the
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communities themselves.
Finally, it is important to notice the silence in this paper on 
the question of state power. There is more than a hint of a 
gradualist, reformist approach to politics. Any consideration of 
the tactics and strategy of working class organisation ought to 
take place within an overall framework of a strategy for 
achieving socialism. Yet this writer completely separates 
immediate strategic and tactical issues from the long term 
objective:
We will not attempt in this paper to deal with the question
as to when and how we might arrive at Socialism (ibid: 8).
4.4 Summary of the theoretical and strategic positions of FOSATU 
leadership, as formulated in the three position papers
1. In all three papers we find that the anti-apartheid struggle 
is a priori populist and undemocratic, suppressing class 
interests and socialist questions. It is therefore incompatible 
with working class interests. This analysis is underpinned by 
ahistorical, static categories which are subjected to no concrete 
materialist analysis: 'populism', 'working class movement', 
'national defence', 'nation building'.
2. In the case of Forster and Erwin, political activity is 
reduced to one element, the struggle for legitimacy as against an 
illegitimate regime. This entails building the unity of the 
people, and establishing legitimacy in the international arena. 
It is these imperatives that dictate the suppression of class 
interests.
3. Class forces do not appear to exist at the political level. 
The working class does not have specific political aims or a 
political programme - thus it inevitably dissolves amongst the 
people. 4
4. There appears to be no relation between, on the one hand, the
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state, politics and popular struggle, and on the other, capital, 
the economy, and working class struggle. These are two distinct 
and separate domains.
5. Class appears to be located in the economy only. The trade 
union is the natural form of organisation for the working class. 
Trade unions, if kept out of popular struggle, express a pure 
working class consciousness. An argument rooted in class 
essentialism. The emphasis on trade unions also entails the 
fetishisation of the model of shopfloor organisation, which is 
most apparent in the anonymous discussion paper. Trade unions 
should take up community issues as trade unions rather than help 
build community organisations.
6. The abstention from the struggle for state power, and the 
almost exclusive focus on trade unions, means that the politics 
of the trade unions is economistic and reformist.^
7. The analytical schema employed in these papers leaves no space 
to theorise the struggle for hegemony on the part of working 
class organisations, nor to think through the concrete strategy 
through which hegemony might be achieved. Coupled with that these 
papers do not grasp the specificity of the political terrain and 
the tasks this imposes on the forces for transformation.
4.5 The determinants of workerism in the FOSATU trade unions
In this Chapter I have analysed the theoretical and strategic 
ideas held by some of the leading intellectuals in FOSATU. 
Clearly these ideas had a great influence on the federation, 
particularly as they were passed on to shop stewards in training 
courses and seminars. But it would be unsatisfactory to try to 
explain the political position and strategy of so large an 4
4. This is most explicit in Friedman, 1987, pp. 484-5. Friedman's 
book is written from within a classic workerist framework, 
extolling the virtues of shopfloor organisation and bargaining, 
and warning about the dangers of 'populism'.
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organisation, particularly one based on democratic structures, in 
terms of the ideas of some of its leaders only. One needs to look 
at the variety of forces acting on the organisation in order to 
understand its political position.
Repression
During the 1970s trade unions were subject to fierce repression. 
It was a struggle simply for the right to exist. Under these 
circumstances, it was a tactical decision for trade unions to 
avoid any sort of action that might be construed as political. 
This practice then persisted into the period when unions had 
established their right to exist, and were facing pressures from 
the popular movement to engage in politics.-*
On the other hand, Mzwakhe reflected that FOSATU's argument had 
some merit in it: his union (UMMAWOSA) had been paralysed by 
repression against its leadership because of their political 
activities in the community (1987b).
Absence of a political movement
The trade unions of the 1970s were the first reassertion of mass 
democratic organisation after the defeat of the popular movement 
in the 1960s. There was no legal political organisation. In the 
circumstances, organising trade unions was in itself a political 
action since it was developing the power and the voice of the 
masses. By the early 1980s, with the re-emergence of the 
democratic movement addressing a wide range of material and 
political grievances, the political task facing trade unionists 
was no longer simply to build unions, but to engage in the wider 
arena of democratic struggle. However, again, the attitudes and 
practices of the earlier years persisted. 5
5. See Zakes, 25.5.87, on the the avoiding of repression as a 
reference point for FOSATU politics.
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The dynamics of trade unionism
Trade unions are located in the economy. Their day to day 
concerns are struggling for recognition, bargaining over wages 
and conditions, striving to regulate the relations between 
management and labour. This is the necessary work of unions, and 
it does tend to create a collective bargaining practice and 
consciousness that favours the development of economising (there 
are however countervailing tendencies which emerge in the 
interviews in Chapter 3, and are theorised in Chapters 5 and 6). 
Nomathemba describes it like this:
During the time of FOSATU even myself, I was not very much 
looking at other community problems, because I was just 
working to get the workers good wages, better working 
conditions and all that...
As I've already said, FOSATU was concentrating on a strong 
shopfloor, I think people at that time were just 
concentrating on that and not thinking as to why do I have 
to wake up and go to work every morning... (Nomathemba, 
1987)
Migrant workers and urban communities
The position of migrant workers as 'temporary sojourners' in 
urban South Africa could influence the attitude to politics of 
those unions with a large migrant membership, such as MAWU. 
Although migrants were at the forefront of many militant 
shopfloor struggles, they could be a conservative political 
force, as witnessed by the clashes between hostel-dwellers and 
urban youth in Langa and Soweto during 1976.
Again, Nomathemba raised this point:
Migrant workers at that time simply sat in their hostels.
6. See Hyman, 1971, for a detailed discussion of these tendencies 
and counter-tendencies.
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They thought township people were mad to get involved in the 
action of students or youth. They would think the youth are 
controlling the parents. They would think of losing their 
job. They would not think of why do I have to be a contract 
worker, and stay like this. If then I am entitled to this 
job why then should I come under such conditions?
Things have changed drastically. Workers are criticising the 
migrant labour system. Migrant workers are now very co­
operative with the community organisations...
That change has happened through the unions, because workers 
have learnt that the problems in the homelands and the 
problems in the townships are the same... In fact, that is 
one thing I preach to the workers when they join the union, 
to close that division... (ibid)
Zakes also spoke about the struggle to overcome this division:
... in KwaThema we've never had a clash between the 
community and the hostel-dwellers, because when we organised 
ERAPO we also organised the hostel-dwellers, organising them 
in the factories, and also organising them in their own 
block committees... at one stage there were people trying to 
defy the stayaways. The people living in the hostels - which 
are at the exit - they were blocking everyone from taking a 
bus to work, and they were checking who was coming from 
work... the hostel-dwellers were the people who were 
stopping people from going. So there was that kind of co-
7operation among the people (Zakes, 1987b). 7
7. See also Nomathemba, 17.8.87 for a description of similar 
events at Daveyton.
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Conservatism of the family
There is an overlap between the political conservatism of migrant 
workers and the conservative attitude of older people towards the 
youth. Since political action in the 70s and 80s has by and large 
been spearheaded by the youth, this could reinforce the 
abstention of the unions from politics. Zakes notes this problem 
when he discusses the forging of closer links between trade union 
structures and the youth:
At the beginning it was not easy. Because some workers felt 
that they cannot be bulldozed by children, and some felt the 
children and the students have taken the right position and 
we need to support them. So it wasn't easy, in some 
factories you would get a clear division among the workers 
and the shop stewards, with workers feeling that the shop 
stewards are entertaining that the children are playing... 
[inaudible], because of the lack of clarification. But after 
people were clarified about the position, that division 
diminished (Zakes, 1987b).
Different experiences of community organisations in different 
regions
Erwin analysed one of the causes for FOSATU' s lack of political 
direction as being the differing experience of community and 
political organisations from region to region. He argued that the 
different regions drew different conclusions from their different 
experiences, and FOSATU then found it very difficult to develop a 
coherent political strategy out of this. It was only out of the 
experiences of the 1984 Transvaal stayaway, and of the building 
of street committees in the communities, that a more unified 
position of involvement in community organisation began to emerge 
(Erwin, 1987).
The role of intellectuals
The role of intellectuals such as those who produced the papers 
analysed above, was clearly very important in shaping the
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political position of FOSATU. Several interviewees stressed the 
importance of seminars and courses in shaping the political 
attitudes of shop stewards. They also spoke about the skills and 
resources that intellectuals, often university-trained, had, and 
which objectively gave them a degree of power in deciding the 
political direction of the federation. They pointed out, too, 
that a distinction exists between shop stewards and rank and file 
membership, and that shop stewards do not necessarily reflect the 
views of those to whom they are accountable.
The question remains, though, as to why these particular 
intellectuals held the views that they did. One would have to 
examine the influence of the student milieu on white campuses 
during the late 60s and early 70s, and in particular the 
experience of student radicalism in 1968, much influenced by the 
1968 uprisings in France and the United States, for a full 
discussion of the intellectual roots of their views.® But 
certainly one crucial determinant of their views is their social 
position in South African society. As whites who did not 
experience racial oppression it was easy to regard this as 
'appearance', as a curtain veiling the reality. At the same time, 
it was an appearance that separated them from the workers; by 
stressing class consciousness rather than racial oppression they 
could attempt to overcome this separation. Also, in the late 60s 
and early 70s black consciousness, which rejected whites as 
having no progressive role to play, was the dominant trend in 
black politics. White intellectuals tended to respond by 
asserting that the fundamental problem was 'class not race', and 
that black consciousness was a petty bourgeois movement founded
Qon false consciousness.
8. For instance, the influence of anarchism in the events of 
Paris '68, and the conservative role of the PCF, are echoed in 
the syndicalism and the hostility to the ANC and SACP of the 
workerist intellectuals. 9
9. Some of these points are made in 'The social background of 
working class leadership', handed in as evidence at the trial of 
Barbara Hogan for ANC activities. 'The social background' is 
highly critical of the political view of white intellectuals in 
the labour movement who, it argues, controlled the direction of
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It seems reasonable to assume that the particular political views 
of leading intellectuals in FOSATU meshed with, and possibly to 
some extent were formed by, the various tendencies towards 
economism and away from politics that I have described above. 
There were of course countervailing tendencies pushing the unions 
towards politics; these have been explored in some detail in 
Chapter 3, and will be returned to in my final chapter.
4.6 THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF WORKERISM
I have described the dominant political position and practice 
within FOSATU as workerist. Taken together the three papers 
analysed above express a fairly consistent position, which, I 
show below, can best be described as a form of syndicalism. No 
doubt the workerist practices of FOSATU were able to shelter a 
variety of political trends, some of which may have been rooted 
in class reductionist Marxism.*® However, in this theoretical 
critique I will concentrate on the position represented by the 
three papers.
Class reductionist forms of Marxism tend to reduce all political 
social and ideological issues directly to class issues, in the
the unions.
10. Barbara Hogan, convicted in 1982 on a charge of treason for 
being a member of the ANC, assessed the political agenda of 
FOSATU as being to build a Bolshevik type party ('Social 
background of working class leadership', court document). Mzwakhe 
also believes this. But while some individuals in FOSATU may have 
held such a position, there is no concrete evidence for it. In 
fact, as I have shown, the evidence shows a vague theory of 
politics closer to syndicalism than to Leninism. It is more than 
likely that the 'hidden agenda' was imagined by Marxist critics 
of FOSATU, who would naturally suppose that FOSATU's practice 
pointed towards the formation of a political party.
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belief that they are expressions of class interests. In the three 
position papers, however, we find a curious kind of class 
reductionism: rather than reducing political forms directly to 
class relations, it defines politics, ideology and the state as 
non-class issues, or as bourgeois class issues, and tends to 
avoid or ignore them. Working class issues are located in the 
economy and in the relation of workers to capital, not to the 
state. Thus for Forster the "essence of politics" is the capital 
labour relation. Only the essence is important for working class 
struggle: the rest is populism. This position bears a striking 
similarity to that of syndicalism.
It is class reductionism that produces the metaphor of apartheid 
as a "curtain" behind which capital can hide (Forster, 1982: 72). 
The class struggle between capital and labour is the real terrain 
of struggle, while the terrain of popular struggle against 
apartheid is mere appearance and draws workers' attention away 
from what is essential.
Class reductionist Marxism tends to discount the specificity of 
the state and the terrain of political struggle, in favour of its 
essence, ie. its class nature. The three position papers however, 
particularly Erwin's, do try to grasp the nature of the state and 
political struggle in South Africa through such concepts as 
"national defence", "nation building", "populism", and the 
struggle for "legitimacy". However, these concepts are static and 
ahistorical, resting on broad generalisations rather than a 
materialist analysis of the historically specific; they in fact 
prevent a knowledge of the specific. Moreover, they do not 
conceive of any relation between the development of capitalism 
and the development of national oppression and apartheid in South 
Africa. Apartheid has its own history, while behind its curtains 
capitalism has its autonomous history. The working class has no 
role to play in the history of apartheid, and so it retreats to 
the sphere of class relations, the economy.
Syndicalism denies the importance of political and ideological 
struggles. It cannot conceptualise the people/power block 
contradiction, which is specific to the political terrain (see 
Laclau, 1977), and has a particular national historical character 
in any given country. Nor does it analyse the relation between
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this political contradiction and the development of capitalism 
and its class contradictions.
The syndicalism analysed here is underpinned by a theoretical 
belief very closely related to class reductionism - class 
essentialism. Class essentialism assumes that the relations of 
production bestow on workers an essential class nature. 
Organisation located in the relations of production comes to 
represent the class nature of the workers and thus their 
essential class political programme. This is the theoretical 
source for a persistent conflation of trade union with working 
class with socialist movement. The working class cannot exist as 
a class in other forms of organisation, at other levels of 
society or sites of struggle.
Class essentialism also assumes that workers' experience of 
exploitation in the relations of production, and of class 
struggle in trade unions, produces a pure class consciousness, 
undiluted by populism, nationalism, etc.1* Thus the importance of 
maintaining the distance of the trade unions from populist or 
nationalist organisations. It is only this trade union-based
11. It is illuminating in this regard to examine back-copies of 
the Federation's newspaper, FOSATU Worker News: it avoids almost 
at all costs carrying news on the UDF or its affiliates. One 
extrordinary example of this is a front page article on the anti- 
Tricameral campaign run by FOSATU: the UDF campaign is not 
referred to once; a mass rally organised by UDF, CAL and the 
trade unions in Cape Town is described as organised by "all the 
independent unions together with other progressive 
organisations", and the only speaker quoted is a FOSATU office 
bearer (FWN, 31, August 1984). Another extreme example is the 
front page article on the Transvaal stayaway in November 1984: 
according to the report it was called by "the independent trade 
union movement and other progressive organisations". No 
organisations besides FOSATU, not even COSAS, are mentioned by 
name (FWN 33/34, Oct/Nov 1984). It is as if the working class is 
a tabula rasa: if only 'populist' organisations can be prevented 
from inscribing their populism there, the trade unions will 
guarantee a pure class consciousness.
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class consciousness that can guarantee change in the interests of 
the working class.
Syndicalism tends therefore to give sole organisational privilege 
to the site in which class relations are constituted. This 
accounts for the invariable tendency of syndicalism towards 
economism, either because of an explicit position that the 
economic struggle is the most important struggle for the working 
class, or because in reducing the political struggle to the 
economic, it fails in any concrete practical way to engage 
workers in political struggle. It is forced to fall back on 
educational programmes that show how capitalism is the 'real' 
problem and socialism the 'real' solution. There is therefore an 
inevitably reformist practice at the heart of workerism.
It must be stressed that the analysis and arguments put forward 
in the three position papers have nothing to do with Marxism, 
class reductionist or otherwise. Their absence of political 
theory, their antagonism to political struggle, and their 
complete separation between the state and the economy, constitute 
a syndicalist position, and historically syndicalism has always 
differed with Marxism on these questions. This is not to suggest 
that this is a conscious position derived from any historical 
model of syndicalism: it is, rather, syndicalism by default.
4.7 STRATEGIC WEAKNESSES OF WORKERISM
The analytical weaknesses of workerism result in a number of 
strategic blindspots.
In the first place workerism abandons the site of national 
political struggle to other social forces, thus isolating itself 
from the burning issues of the day, and failing to grasp the 
importance of national liberation to workers. The UDF in 
contrast, drawing on the Congress tradition with its decades of 
experience in mobilising and organising around national 
oppression, was able to mobilise massive support against the 
Tricameral Parliament. Both Zakes and Vincint testified to the 
importance of the UDF calling on "society" as a whole, rather
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than on trade union membership only. The struggles of that period 
placed national liberation high on the public agenda, and as a 
result the Congress position grew amongst the people. Some of the 
interviews quoted in Chapter 3 show this graphically.
During this period of intense political struggle, workerism 
became more and more isolated, less and less able to deal with 
political issues in a convincing way. In contrast, the SFAWU 
paper argues that
It is clear to us that one cannot separate the struggle for 
national freedom from the struggle for our rights in the 
factory (SFAWU, 1985: 3).
Worker leaders in Springs had practical experience of building 
their leadership in the community:
What we discovered was that organised workers were always 
giving direction because of the experience that they had, 
because of them being somehow in the majority, so the 
intellectuals in the community could not have their way open 
because they did not have a programme, whereas the organised 
workers had a programme and everybody else understood their 
programme and followed them. The fear was there that 
professionals, like teachers, doctors, and maybe shopkeepers 
might want to dominate and be at the top at all times 
because of being fluent in English, being in business for 
some time, being teachers... but they did not have an 
organisational idea. So that theory was completely not 
there. Organised workers were taking the lead, together with 
the students.
By a programme, I mean organised workers would talk about an 
action, which would be effective.If workers talk about a 
stayaway it means there will be a stayaway. If they talk 
about striking because DET [ The Dept, of Education and 
Training ] will not grant something to the students, it will 
mean an action. Whereas you find a businessman saying he 
can't close the whole day, he will lose business. But 
because of being a minority, they ended up accepting the 
direction given by the workers.
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Q: Some tendencies argued that workers would be misled or 
submerged in the communities.
In practice it doesn't happen that way. I mean that's the 
theory we were also given at some stage, that we shouldn't 
make a mistake if we wanted to keep our organisation intact, 
and get involved in all those mass organisations. But in 
practice when we started to go in that was not the case. 
That marks the end of AZAPO in our area, which was the only 
organisation which existed at one stage. But when we started 
to organise and get into the masses, and encourage the 
youth, encourage the civic, encourage the taxis to organise 
themselves, AZAPO vanished, because ERAPO affiliated to the 
UDF, so anyone who came in there had to belong to the UDF, 
and nobody wanted to be left out. So AZAPO had to call it a 
day, join the masses as individuals and agree to the UDF.
Zakes saw the workers as a powerful force for organising the 
unity of the townships:
That is why you find clashes in places like Joburg, where 
you find AZAPO fighting UDF. The workers in that area do not 
take the initiative of moving into the township, forming one 
organisation, getting everyone together under one flag. So 
AZASM started to grow freely. COSAS grew also. So you had 
these two pillars, parallel, coming up equally in some 
respects, and the clashes started to happen.
But because we moved in early, started to get the students 
organised. We didn't want another ideology coming up, we 
wanted one ideology, that of the people. So the AZASM that 
started coming up... was suppressed, it never got off the 
ground. That is why we've never had clashes at Springs, 
students clashing... (Zakes, 1987b)
(This comment does need to be placed in the context of the vastly 
differing social structure of Soweto and KwaThema: Soweto is 
massively bigger, with a much greater class differentiation. It 
is much more difficult for organised workers to have an impact on 
such a township.)
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This experience of engaging in 'populist' politics and forging 
alliance stands in stark contrast to the FOSATU position papers 
analysed above, particularly the anonymous 'Discussion paper'. 
The specific case of the boycott of white shops in Springs, 
described by Vincint in Chapter 3, contrasts radically with the 
'Discussion Paper' version of the inevitable populism of such a 
campaign, and reveals the emptiness of the argument: popular 
politics is, in organisational, ideological and strategic terms a 
contested terrain in which different social forces struggle for 
hegemony.
Zakes also referred to the unity of hostel-dwellers with the 
community, that had been built by organising them at the 
workplace and in ERAPO (see above, Chapter 4.5). Both he and 
Nomathemba referred to the violent clashes between migrants and 
township residents in another East Rand township, Tsakane, after 
students burnt down the beerhall. The only organisation in the 
township was COSAS.
There was nothing as such that was happening in the civic in 
Tsakane. And the workers were not unionised either. Hostel 
dwellers were scantily unionised. It was premature for union 
members at the hostels to even talk about workers' 
struggles, let alone other struggles...
. . . they were still having that problem of isolating 
themselves from the community (Nomathemba, 1987).
The low level of unity seems to have been a result of the fact 
that Tsakane workers work in factories in a number of different 
industrial areas, often far away from each other. At any rate, 
the result was a disastrous conflict that ended with migrant 
workers forced to leave the hostels and live elsewhere.
It was sad, many people said so, it was sad when the buses 
came to fetch the hostel-dwellers... They left many 
belongings, they did not have a chance to fetch them (ibid).
For Zakes and Nomathemba, this is a graphic illustration of the 
need to organise communities:
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The whole thing was out ol hand, no-one was able to give any 
direction, because the system had already made use of the 
opportunity, saying it was supporting the hostel-dwellers 
(ibid).
At the heart of workerism's abstention from politics is the 
absence of any strategy for addressing the question of state 
power. The SFAWU paper puts forward the reasons why trade unions 
on their own cannot address this question:
We cannot engage in a wide range of activity that is 
necessary to successfully challenge the state and create a 
society where workers have control.
It is this wide range of activity that escapes the attention of 
workerism, focussed as it is on one form of organisation and one 
kind of activity.
Mzwakhe made several references in the interview to his 
experience that FOSATU did not address the question of state 
power. In his view the need to address this question dictated an 
immediate strategy of participating in the broader democratic 
struggle:
...the workers are involved in boycotting rent, boycotting 
buses, but what we've got to do, as workers and as working 
class leaders, is inject working class practices within 
those structures. We should not postpone working class 
leadership within those structures until a later date. What 
sort of government will take over when we lift the flag over 
Union Buildings will be determined by the class composition 
of those who will be in power. That is why it is so 
important not to postpone working class leadership... 
(Mzwakhe, 1987)
This is an argument for alliances between the working class and 
other classes, both within multi-class organisations such as UDF 
and civics, and between working class organisations such as trade 
unions and the organisations of other classes, eg. taxi-drivers 
or traders. It is an argument for the working class to develop
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and assert its leadership within such alliances.
Workerism, in contrast, is exceedingly suspicious of alliances 
between trade unions and other organisations. Partly this is 
because of a general mistrust of politics, partly because of a 
more specific mistrust of any class alliances, because they are 
held to compromise working class practices and independence. The 
dismissal of alliances has the practical consequence that workers 
cannot build their leadership over other classes and within 
various other organisations. In some cases the result was 
mistrust and suspicion towards the trade unions on the part of 
community organisations, rather than respect for the capacity of 
the organised workers to lead struggle.1^
Partly, too, the argument against alliances rests on a 
conflation of the question of alliances between trade unions and 
other popular organisations with the question of alliances 
between the working class and other classes. Source of the 
conflation is workerism's class essentialism. The trade unions 
represent the working class and other organisations represent 
other classes. Such an analysis generally produces an incoherent 
strategy, since it assumes that there is no worker membership in 
youth organisations, civics and UDF. In other words, these 
organisations in themselves constitute class alliances. But 
workerism is prevented by its analysis from taking on the task of 
organising the working class wherever it is found - in civic 
organisation, youth organisation, amongst the unemployed, in 
political organisations. As the SFAWU paper puts it,
. . . the East Rand, where our unions built up a powerful 
shopfloor organisation, but were not able to represent fully 
the social interests of the workers in the townships like 
in the case of rent, transport and other community based 
struggles (SFAWU, 1985: 5).
Continually stressed by SFAWU members was that the working class
12. Zakes describes a case in the Eastern Cape where workers were 
prevented by the organisers of the funeral of a worker from their 
factory from wearing FOSATU T-shirts.
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is much more than employed workers who are organised at work. 
Their conception of the working class extended to unemployed 
workers, to the youth who have never worked, and even to the 
children of working class parents who are studying at school. 
They saw it as important to organise all these various sectors of 
the working class around their immediate problems, to organise 
the working class for struggle at the various sites of 
oppression, whether as unemployed ( Amalova), as township 
residents (ERAPO), as school students (COSAS) - or politically as 
oppressed and exploited people in the liberation movement (UDF). 
Only through organising the working class in this way could the 
unity of the working class be built. And only through organising 
the class in this way could it achieve hegemony in the overall 
struggle of the people for freedom.
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CHAPTER 5
THEORETICAL ISSUES IN MARXISM AND THE 'NATIONAL QUESTION'
The critique of workerism as class reductionist in Chapter 4 
raises a critical theoretical question: if class reductionism, 
Marxist or otherwise, does not produce useful political insights, 
what is a non-reductionist Marxism? Is a non-reductionist Marxism 
possible?
There is a strong tendency in Marxism, starting with Marx and 
Engels, to view the capital/labour contradiction as fundamentally 
antagonistic and therefore the source of a class conflict that 
inevitably culminates in revolution. The struggles that take 
place in production generate a basic class consciousness that, 
when extended (under the leadership of a working class party) 
beyond the workplace to confront the class state, is transformed 
into revolutionary class consciousness in a struggle to overthrow 
capitalism and build socialism. Such is the conception explicitly 
developed in texts such as The Communist Manifesto; Socialism: 
scientific and utopian; Chapter 32 of Capital 1; and What is to 
be done?
The assumption that the relations of exploitation produce class 
consciousness makes it difficult for Marxism to explain cases 
where workers do not exhibit class consciousness (white workers 
in South Africa, for example) without resort to the 
unsatisfactory notion of false consciousness. Marxism also 
confronts a problem when it leaves the sphere of production, 
exchange and distribution of commodities for the sphere of civil 
society and the state. Marxism holds that in some sense the forms 
and struggles on the terrain of politics and ideology are 
determined by class relations in the economy. In what precise 
sense they are so determined is the subject of long and rich
107
theoretical debate which has yet to be resolved.
The class reductionism and class essentialism which, I have 
argued, is integral to workerism, obviously can find some support 
in particular texts of Marxism. (This would be more the case with 
Marxist trends which might exist within workerism than with 
syndicalist trends: syndicalism, as argued above, tends to differ 
radically from Marxism on political issues) These are problem 
areas in Marxist theory; so much so that some theorists have 
foresaken Marxism altogether for the dubious benefits of post­
structuralist relativism. In this section I want to reflect on 
some of these theoretical issues, in order to see what light the 
experiences and struggles of workers on the East Rand, discussed 
in the previous chapters, can cast on them.
5.1 Trade unions and class consciousness
The struggles within FOSATU described in Chapter 3 show quite 
clearly that trade unions do not simply reflect or express class 
consciousness.
On the one hand, this is because trade unions are organisations 
with complex structures at shopfloor, local, regional and 
national levels. Officials, office-bearers and representatives at 
the different levels have access to different experiences, 
educational programmes and information, are subject to different 
pressures and demands, and identify with the organisation 
differently. Several interviewees stressed that one has to 
distinguish between shop stewards and rank and file membership, 
and that shop stewards do not necessarily represent the views and 
interests of the rank and file. In particular, shop stewards are 
exposed to intensive union education programmes which often have 
political content (Mzwakhe, 1987; Robert 1987b; Zakes, 1987a).
Even more so is it the case that officials do not necessarily 
directly express the view of their membership:
We must draw a distinction between the position of a few
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officials in FOSATU and the position of most of the workers 
- and in COSATU for that matter. That is an important 
distinction, because all of us claim to speak on behalf of 
the workers (Mzwakhe, 1987).
Mzwakhe also drew attention to the skills and theory that 
organisers with a university training have compared to those who 
develop organically from the shopfloor, and the power this places 
in their hands.
Furthermore, the consciousness of the members of trade unions is 
not 'produced' by trade union experience only. Workers have a 
range of experiences of different kinds of oppression, and this 
has just as important a bearing on consciousness as trade union 
and workplace experience. Mzwakhe interpreted the effect of 
different experiences like this:
Workers are caught in a situation where they've got 
allegiances to trade union officials because they are 
pushing better wages and conditions. They've also got 
allegiances with the community, which is pushing for total 
liberation. So they're aligned with the union, but not 
necessarily adopting its political position (ibid).
He quoted the example of the Port Elizabeth stayaway in 1985, 
opposed by the unions, but "supported 100% by the workers" (the 
stayaway was in fact not supported by coloured workers - which 
supports Mzwakhe's thesis, since coloured communities have been 
historically far less involved in liberation politics (LMG, SALB 
11.7) .
Thus workers consciousness and attitudes are constituted by a 
range of different experiences and organisations. The local 
civic, or UDF, or the trade union, all 'call' or interpolate 
him/her differently, and there is nothing inherent in the 
workplace or trade union which necessarily takes precedence over 
other interpolations. In fact, in a society so dominated by 
national oppression as South Africa, and where political power is 
so immediate an issue, the organisation or force which can 
present itself as a coherent political oppositional force is more 
likely to influence political consciousness than is the trade
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union (that is, if they are presented as alternatives rather than 
as complementary).
But if we restrict ourselves simply to the question of how trade 
union organisation constitutes the consciousness of its members, 
even here there is a contested terrain, a struggle over the 
identity of the workers, of the working class, and of the meaning 
of trade union struggle. There could for instance be a struggle 
over whether the trade union task is to do a better deal with 
capital in the bargain over wages and conditions, or whether it 
is to increase workers' control within production, or whether it 
is part of a broader political project. Thus the struggle 
described within FOSATU was in part over whether the working 
class was to be constituted as part of the national liberation 
movement, or outside of it as a pure class. It was also a 
struggle over whether the working class was to consist solely of 
workers organised at the point of production, or whether it was 
to encompass workers organised elsewhere, as well as the 
unemployed and the families of workers. Organisations and 
ideologies are constantly constituting social forces and 
struggling over their constitution.
This raises the question of the role of leadership. Nomathemba 
explained that she always "preaches" to workers to close the gap 
between migrants and urban-dwellers. Zakes described the role of 
shop stewards in explaining to members why they should co-operate 
with the youth. These are examples of the tasks that fall to 
leadership, and that are an aspect of constituting the working 
class in a certain way. Thus one of the necessary distinctions 
between shop stewards and rank and file membership lies in the 
role of the shop steward as leader.
There is a complex interplay between leadership and 
accountability, between the need for strategic and analytical 
experience, clarity and training, on the one hand, and mass 
initiative and creativity on the other. This complex dialectical 
process is not adequately captured by the notion of 'workers' 
control', so often referred to by workerism (Zakes, 1987a; 
Mzwakhe, 1987), and used as a justification for not co-operating 
with organisations which lack 'it' (workers' control).
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Although one could perhaps describe a struggle between members 
and officials of petty bourgeois origins as a class struggle, it 
would seem misleading to describe a struggle between different 
political tendencies in a trade union, for example that between a 
workerist and a Congress position, as a class struggle. 
Workerism does not imply a purer class consciousness, nor does a 
congress position signify an abandoning of class: most of the 
interviewees suggest that constituting a working class position 
within the liberation movement comprises a more advanced form of 
class consciousness since it is aware of its national tasks.
This ideological struggle is not in itself a class struggle, and 
cannot be reduced to such, since it takes place within the class: 
it is a struggle over how the class is to be constituted. To sum 
up my argument: trade unions do not 'reflect' or 'express' some 
essence of what the working class is. They are one of a number of 
organisations located in different terrains or sites, that 
struggle to constitute the working class as an organised social 
force. Class is an abstract category that cannot specify how 
workers - or any other class - come to exist as an organised 
social force.* How the working class is constituted 
organisationally, ideologically and politically - is not 
determined by 'essential' class interests but is itself the 
subject of more or less intense struggle.
The way in which the working class is constituted, however, is 
not arbitrary; it is constrained by real material, social and 
ideological interests and issues. It would be exceedingly 
difficult, for instance, to constitute white trade unions as UDF 
affiliates. The workerist leadership in FOSATU lost their 
dominant position because they were unable to address the burning 
political question - which in South Africa means the national 
question (national oppress ion,of course, does not only exist 
outside of the workplace). Other organisations were organising 
the oppressed in a national struggle for freedom, addressing both 
immediate material grievances as well as the widest political
1. Wolpe, 1987, discusses the difference between class as an 
abstract concept, and the internal divisions and differences that 
characterise the working class in reality, p. 62 - 3
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issues. The congress leadership came to dominate the union 
movement because they were able to link trade union issues with 
the broader national movement, and thus articulate the range of 
workers' experiences into a coherent whole, a whole from which 
the workerist position appeared to exclude them.
5.2 The trade union as a category of analysis, and the primary 
contradiction in a capitalist social formation
Hyman (1971) discusses the question of whether trade unions are 
intrinsically reformist or whether they have revolutionary 
potential. He describes two main trends in the Marxist tradition, 
an optimistic trend which believes trade unions have great 
revolutionary potential (Marx, Engels), and a pessimistic trend 
which believes they are intrinsically reformist 'managers of 
discontent' (Lenin, Trotsky and various bourgeois theorists).
Hyman discusses the bargaining relation that develops between 
unions and management, and the tendency for union leadership to 
develop into a bureaucracy with interests distinct from their 
membership. He discusses too, as countervailing tendencies, the 
pressure of democracy, the need to 'deliver the goods', and the 
inability of the capitalist economy to actually deliver the goods 
when in crisis. He concludes
Pure and simple trade union activity does pose a substantial 
threat to the stability of the capitalist economy in certain 
circumstances. The iron law of oligarchy is subject to 
important constraints. Attempts to extend the process of 
incorporation do meet significant obstacles to success. To 
this extent, the 'optimistic' interpretation of trade 
unionism cannot be rejected outright (ibid: 37).
Trade unions embody "a revolt which can challenge the fundamental 
basis of capitalism on two fronts". This is so because, firstly, 
"unionism represents a reaction against economic exploitation”, 
and secondly "and less coherently, unionism also raises issues of 
power and control" which lead the working class to develop 
(quoting Hobsbawm), "a general discontent with the existing 
system, a general aspiration after a more satisfactory one, and a
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general outline (co-operative against competitive, socialist 
against individualistic) of alternative social arrangements..." 
(ibids 38-9)
Hyman does manage to capture the contradictory tensions within 
the role of trade unions, but his analysis is ultimately 
unsatisfactory because he limits it to a consideration only of 
the capital/labour contradiction and the role of trade unions. 
Thus he discusses only one condition that has the potential to 
impel trade unions into a strongly anti-capitalist position: when 
there is an economic crisis such that the ruling class is forced 
to attack the living standards of the working class. He does not 
discuss the potential impact of political crisis on the political 
position of trade unions, nor does he discuss the importance of 
political forms (bourgeois democracy, feudal rule, colonial rule, 
military dictatorship, apartheid) in shaping the political 
consciousness and response of workers, and creating the framework 
within which the political response to economic crisis is 
constituted. My analysis has shown, however, the crucial 
significance of national oppression for explaining the political 
struggles within and strategies of the trade unions in South 
Africa. Webster makes the same point:
...the transformation of the labour process has created the 
potential for mass-based industrial trade unions, while 
failing to provide the conditions for their political 
incorporation (Webster, 1985:279).
Webster captures here the importance of a consideration of both 
the labour process and the political configuration in determining 
the political direction of trade unions. It is the transformation 
of the labour process into the form of large scale mass 
production based on semi-skilled operators that provides the 
material basis for militant mass-based industrial unions (see
2. Hyman does note the British labour movement's traditional 
reverence for parliamentarism, but does not draw out the 
implications of the particular national political configuration 
for the politics of trade unions that are suggested by this 
observation, ibid, p. 39
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Chapter 2.1); it is the political configuration that determines 
whether these unions will take on a fundamentally political 
character and become component parts of the struggle for 
democratic rights, or whether they will restrict themselves to 
collective bargaining.
It is the specific national question in South Africa which made 
the workerist project an impossible one: the model of a working 
class movement based on the British model of collective­
bargaining unionism and a reformist social-democratic Labour 
Party simply could not develop in a different social and 
political context.
The implication of my argument is that one cannot consider the 
problems of class, class struggle and class consciousness, 
political struggle and revolution in terms only of the 
capital/labour contradiction as specified by the concept of the 
capitalist mode of production. Of course, the attempt to do 
precisely this has noble (not in the class sense of the term!) 
origins: not only the more polemical and determinist of the 
classical Marxist texts (such as the Manifesto and Socialism: 
scientific and utopian), but also the greatest project of Marx's 
life, Capital, contains passages, especially in the famous 
Chapter 32, which predict the demise of capitalism because of the 
irreconcilable contradiction between capital and labour, which 
creates not only capital's gravedigger in the form of the 
proletariat, but ever greater crises of capitalist accumulation. 
Large sections of Marx's text, especially in Volume 3, read as a 
struggle on Marx's part to prove that according to its own 
contradictory laws of motion the capitalist mode of production is 
bound to produce the revolution which will usher in a new social 
order. It is this belief that explains his optimism about the 
revolutionary potential of trade unions.
Unfortunately, proving this is an impossible project. Marx did 
not discover the laws that could demonstrate that revolution and 
socialism are necessarily produced by economic contradictions. 
Which leaves Marxists with the question - how do revolutions 
occur?
Althusser and Balibar tried to solve this problem by moving away
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from the economic reduct ionism of the focus only on the 
capital/labour relation. Althusser based his argument on Lenin's 
analysis of the Russia as "the weakest link” in the chain of 
imperialist states. It was the weakest link because it contained 
"the accumulation and exacerbation of all the historical 
contradictions then possible in a single state": contradictions 
of a feudal regime ruling viciously over a vast peasantry at the 
dawn of the twentieth century; of large scale capitalist 
exploitation in the cities; of colonial exploitation and wars in 
the reaches of the Empire; between advanced capitalist production 
and medieval countryside; contradictions within the ruling 
classes; the history of revolutionary organisations that produced 
the Bolshevik party; the imperialist war; and others (Althusser, 
1977: 96).
Althusser draws the following theoretical conclusions:
... if the general contradiction ( . . . the contradiction 
between the forces and relations of production, essentially 
embodied in the contradiction between two antagonistic 
classes) is sufficient to define the situation when 
revolution is the task of the day, it cannot of its own 
simple, direct power induce a revolutionary situation... If 
this contradiction is to become active in the strongest 
sense, to become a ruptural principle, there must be an 
accumulation of circumstances and currents, so that... they 
fuse in a ruptural unity: when they produce the result of 
the immense majority of the popular masses grouped in an 
assault on a regime which its ruling classes are unable to 
defend...How else could the class divided popular masses 
throw themselves together... How else could the ruling 
classes... find themselves reduced to impotence, divided at 
the decisive moment, with neither new political solutions 
nor new political leaders, deprived of foreign class- 
support, disarmed in the very citadel of their State 
machine, and suddenly overwhelmed by the people they had so 
long kept in leash and respectful by exploitation, violence 
and deceit? If, as in this situation, a vast accumulation of 
contradictions comes into play in the same court, some of 
which are radically heterogeneous... but which nevertheless 
merge in a ruptural unity, we can no longer talk of the
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sole, unique power of the general contradiction... these 
contradictions... derive from the relations of production... 
from the superstructures, instances which derive from it but 
have their own consistency and effectivity, from the 
international conjuncture itself, which intervenes as a 
determination with a specific role to play (ibid: 99-100).
Thus Althusser attempts to theorise the significance of 
superstructural forces and crises, of contingent events that are 
not produced by the structure but none the less affect it, and of 
the national and international conjuncture.
Balibar argues the same point, basing it on Marx's analysis in 
Capital 3:
...the result of the contradiction is always a certain 
equilibrium, even when this equilibrium is attained by means 
of a crisis.
Thus the only intrinsic result of the contradiction, which 
is completely immanent to the economic structure, does not 
tend towards the supersession of the contradiction, but to 
the perpetuation of its conditions...
... [but] the effects within the structure of production... 
may be one of the conditions (the 'material basis') of a 
different result, outside the structure of production 
(Althusser and Balibar, 1979: 290-93).
Ultimately Balibar's attempt to resolve this problem is 
unsatisfactory, since he does not theorise the place of class and 
other struggles adequately: class struggle seems to belong to 
another 'instance' of the social structure, ie. it is something 
external to the economic structure and which under specific 
conditions intervenes in it (ibid: 293-305).
Although Althusser and Balibar point the way to the 'relative 
autonomy' of the political terrain they conceptualised it more as 
a structure than as a site of struggle. They were unable to move 
away from a highly abstract notion of 'class struggle', and in 
his later texts Althusser returned to a rather crude,
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fundamentalist exposition of the necessity and inevitability of 
the relations of production producing class struggle (Althusser 
1976: 203).
Laclau, in a very fruitful essay, (Laclau, 1977) tried to think 
through concretely the implications for political struggle of the 
concept of the specificity and relative autonomy of the political 
structure, reflecting particularly on the experiences of populist 
struggle in Latin America. He argued that the political terrain 
is marked by a contradiction peculiar to it, a contradiction 
between the people, on the one hand, and the ruling block, on the 
other. This contradiction is constituted by the political 
structure, in the same way as the class contradiction is 
constituted by the relations of production, and it cannot be 
reduced to the latter contradiction. Laclau thus enables theory 
to grasp the way the institutions and practices of apartheid and 
national oppression have so structured social and political life 
in South Africa as to define the terrain of struggle for 
political power.
The political contradiction shapes a particular terrain of 
ideological and political struggle. It is a terrain occupied by 
popular ideologies, symbols and traditions, many of them with no 
particular class belonging or class nature. Although popular 
ideologies have no particular class nature, they cannot be 
articulated independently of class discourse; thus there is a 
continuous struggle between the fundamental classes, proletariat 
and bourgeoisie, to articulate popular ideologies into their own 
class discourse. Class discourse cannot appear on the political 
terrain other than articulated with popular ideology - there is 
no such thing as a pure class ideology at this level.
This struggle within popular ideology is the struggle for 
hegemony, the struggle on the part of the fundamental 
antagonistic classes to become the representative and main 
organising force of the 'people'. The working class tries to 
incorporate populism into its revolutionary project, the 
bourgeoisie tries to maintain its position as representative of 
the nation.
The contributions of Althusser, Balibar and Laclau are attempts
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to go beyond the class reduct ion i sin implicit in much of Marxism, 
and which reduces politics, the state and ideology to 
epiphenomena of the fundamental class contradictions determined 
by the relations of production. Their work suggests that the 
attempts by such theorists as Hyman (1971), Burawoy (1985), and 
Cressey & Maclnnis (Capital and Class 11) to analyse the 
political position of the trade unions and the working class 
solely in terms of the primary contradiction and workplace 
experiences, without reference to the nationally specific 
political and ideological terrain, is misguided. The early 
Gramsci, too, focussed on the worker councils at the workplace as 
the embryonic forms of the new society, neglecting the wider 
political arena and the contest for state power, which imposes on 
the working class the task of building a hegemonic bloc in 
opposition to the bourgeois regime (Gramsci, 1968). It was the 
failure of the factory council .strategy and the defeat of the 
working class movement by Fascism, a movement which drew on 
profoundly popular roots, that turned his attention to the work 
for which he is famous, ie precisely work on the question of 
hegemony and national-popular ideologies.
These issues are not new ones to the political struggle in South 
Africa. The early history of the Communist Party of South Africa 
is the story of a theoretical, ideological and strategic struggle 
to overcome the prescriptions of class reductionism for a unity 
of white and black workers against capitalism. The adoption of 
the Native Republic thesis and the strategy of alliance with the 
ANC, initiated in the late 1920s, mark the realisation that the 
character of the national question must define decisively the 
appropriate political strategy to be pursued by working class 
organisations. Of course, the Native Republic thesis did not 
mark the end but only the beginning of the quest for a proper 
relation between class and national struggle in South Africa.
5.3 The 'National Question': the specificity of politics
3. See Bunting, 1975, esp. Chap. 2, and Simons and Simons, 1983, 
esp. Chap. 17.
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The foregoing discussion of attempts within Marxism to move 
beyond the confines of class reductionism, to theorise the 
existence of a combination of contradictions, and the specificity 
of the political terrain, brings us to the national question, ie. 
to the question of the specific form of political struggle in 
South Africa, in both its theoretical and its political aspects.
The issue that needs to be examined in relation to this question 
is that of the relation, theoretically and practically, between 
the concepts "class" and "nation", and between class struggle and 
national struggle. The national liberation movement asserts, in 
contrast to the workerist position discussed above, that national 
liberation struggle and class struggle are not mutually exclusive 
but dialectically linked; yet until recently insufficient 
attention had been paid to theorising this relation.^ Simons and 
Simons, for example, describe the adoption of the Native Republic 
thesis by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) as
... a great advance in the analysis of the relations between 
national and class forces in the liberation movement. The 
party had at last found a firm foundation in Marxist theory 
for an unequivocal affirmation of the African's claim to 
govern his country (Simons & Simons, 1983: 411).
But they do not actually explain how Marxist theory does - or 
might - affirm the strategy chosen by the CPSA or analyse the 
relation between national and class forces. Their book is 
primarily a description of the developing relation between the 
CPSA and the ANC, and is disappointingly silent on the 
theoretical issues.
It is my contention that the most fruitful way to explore the 
relation between class and nation is to recognise the irreducible 
specificity of the political terrain. "Nation" is a concept 
defined by the structures and contradictions of the political 
terrain, and primarily the state; whereas "class" is a concept 
defined primarily by the relations of production, at the level of 
the economy.
4. Wolpe, 1975, makes the same point. See p. 234
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Gelb makes this point in an interesting discussion of the 
determinants of nationalism. He points out the inadequacy of 
Stalin's "mechanistic and schematic" notion of the nation, 
according to which a nation is defined by having a common 
territory, economy, language and culture, and turns instead to 
Benedict Anderson's concept of the nation as "an imagined 
political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign" (quoted in Gelb, 1984: 10).
Thus the nation is seen to be an ideological concept, 
relating to the political arena and expressed through being 
represented by a sovereign state...
... it is possible to argue that the SA state is premised on 
the exclusion of blacks from the racially divided "imagined 
community" whose sovereignty it represents...
The nationalist response... perceives racial domination in 
all its manifestations as being rooted essentially in the 
exclusion from the "imagined community"... [which] gives 
rise naturally to an alternative conception of the "imagined 
community", a different nation. This conception also 
suggests that nationalist struggle involves a process of 
ideological construction of this different nation, rather 
than simply reflecting a pre-given nation (ibid).
Thus it is clear that the nation is the object of a struggle, of 
efforts to constitute it in various ways, and that these 
struggles are crucially defined by the nature of the state. In 
South Africa the Nationalist government has, through the state, 
striven to organise and constitute a white nation, while 
disorganising any attempt to constitute a black or non-racial 
nation, attempting to constitute instead a variety of ethnic 
"nations" based on the bantustans.
There have historically been a variety of responses on the part 
of organisations of the oppressed: Inkatha is the strongest 
example of an effort to constitute an ethnic nation; for its 
part, the Congress Alliance represented an effort to combine, 
primarily, a militant African and Indian nationalism, but
120
including also organisations of coloured people and white 
democrats, in building a non-racial South African nation as 
envisaged in the Freedom Charter. Rejecting this, the PAC broke 
away in 1959 on the platform of an exclusive African nationalism. 
Where the black consciousness movement in the late 60s and early 
70s picked up this theme in the effort to constitute a black 
nation that excluded whites, the non-racial movement took up the 
Congress tradition's task of building a non-racial nation as the 
antithesis of apartheid's racist policies. Anderson's concept of 
nation allows us to theorise these struggles to constitute a 
nation in opposition to the nations constituted by apartheid. It 
shows us that the nation is not pre-given, but nor are the 
struggles to constitute it arbitrary - the options and limits 
available to oppositional forces (or phrased differently, their 
national tasks) are defined by the structures and strategies of 
the state.
This is an important point because it indicates that the nation 
is not simply an imagined community - it is material in that it 
is constituted by structures, institutions and organisations as 
well as by ideology. Racially exclusive parliaments, bantustan 
governments, administration boards, population registration, 
Group Areas, pass laws, job reservation, land and capital 
ownership - all of these structure the terrain on which different 
"nations" have to be constituted and "imagined". For their part, 
trade unions, community, political and cultural organisations 
amongst the oppressed are inseparable from the struggle to 
construct an alternative "imagined community."
Unfortunately, Gelb's useful remarks peter out as he does not 
come to grips with the issue of how class struggles might relate 
to such a definition of the nation. He asserts, but does not 
demonstrate, that national struggles are "concerned quite 
narrowly with issues of citizenship and political equality" 
(ibid: 11)/ whereas a working class perspective requires more 
than this - it requires an extension of democracy beyond the 
state to all spheres of social existence. He criticises the 
Colonialism of a Special Type thesis (CST) adopted by the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) in 1962, and which became current 
in the ANC at least by the late 1960s, as necessarily entailing a 
separation of the struggle against capitalism from that against
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national oppression, because it is based on a transposition of 
analytical categories into substantive regions of social life.**
As an alternative, Gelb proposes a theory which recognises that 
"it is not possible to distinguish the economic, political and 
ideological instances or moments of concrete social relations 
except analytically" (my emphasis) (ibid: 15) , and suggests a 
strategy of mobilising and organising the black working class 
against both its exploitation and its oppression as a class, in 
place of the CST strategy of mobilising a multi-class alliance 
"based on an ideology with no class content" (ibid: 11). While 
these remarks are interesting, they have clearly lost sight of 
the concept of national struggle - inevitable so, because the 
state is defined here as an analytical category which can only be 
distinguished from the economy analytically. This robs the state 
and the political terrain of its concrete and specific existence 
as a set of institutions and practices which is distinct from the 
economy. Gelb confuses the observation that the state and the 
economy cannot exist without each other, ie that the existence of 
a capitalist economy necessarily entails the existence of a 
state, with the idea that they are indistinguishable. The state 
and political contradictions then collapse into the economy, and 
the national question disappears.
Nolutshungu takes the discussion several steps further with an 
extended argument for the specificity of the political terrain. 
"The most important political concerns are also, naturally 
enough, the most potent symbols in the ideological struggles of 
the day. In our time they are those of freedom , self- 
determination and democracy... These are irreducibly political 
concerns." (Nolutshungu, 1983: 37). These concerns refer to 
"power and powerlessness, domination and submission, authority 
and obedience - notions that are at the centre of what, in any 
language, we mean by 'politics'.” (ibid: 38)
5. ibid, p. 3ff. His argument here is unconvincing, since it is 
based on a limited number of texts and a selective reading of 
them. The quotes he uses to substantiate the argument can be 
contradicted by other quotes from the same sources, at least in 
the cases of "AP" and Nolutshungu.
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Politics as a distinct terrain is less amenable than economics to 
comprehensive theorisation:
It is not a simple end-directed process conducted with 
measurable objects in a fairly limited range of probable 
combinations. It has either no object, or many objects that 
are both material and ideal, with the relation of means to 
ends often obscure. It is, strictly, not a system of 
processes but a field of practices, contingent and 
strategic... largely influenced by contingent historical 
circumstances often specific to each country, making 
generalisation difficult (ibid: 42).
Nolutshungu argues that political domination does not simply 
correspond to class domination; it can entail a "range of 
distinctive political and ideological relations as its 
supports... [which] may widen or narrow the range of those who 
are dominated..." (ibid: 55)
Nationalist resistance arises, then, "principally in relation to 
political domination and its very particular effects." (ibid: 56) 
The "problem of nationalism and nationalities, which so often 
seems difficult to understand in class terms alone, and is yet so 
important in the process of political change", can then best be 
understood in terms of the distinctiveness of politics, ie as a 
response to particular forms of domination (ibid). Although 
nationalism is primarily a response to relations of domination it 
can disrupt the order of exploitation as well and open the way to 
its overthrow. Nationalism can have different class meanings - it 
can provide a point of entry for socialist ideas, and it can be 
violently opposed to socialism. Its class meaning depends on 
class struggle within nationalism (ibid: 59).
Nolutshungu concludes that
The different mobilisational alternatives in relation to 
racial/national assertion were themselves profoundly 
influenced by the distinctive structural characteristics of 
the polity in such a way that they could not merely 
represent, with total fidelity, the contending interests of
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classes economically defined... (ibid: 64)
It is in this sense that "the national struggles that have 
dominated black resistance are historically appropriate."
While Nolutshungu does point towards nationalism being a 
contested terrain itself, in which different class forces strive 
for hegemony, he does not adequately theorise the relation of 
class and class struggle to politics and national struggle. None 
the less, he does advance the search for a non-reductionist 
Marxism further than most other writers on the national question.
An anonymous writer in Africa Perspective (hereinafter referred 
to as AP) (Africa Perspective, 1983) , for instance, attempts to 
provide an alternative to the economism of Wolpe (1975). Wolpe 
had criticised the SACP's formulation of CST as not specifying 
the relation between class exploitation and national oppression, 
and suggested that the specific form of class exploitation in 
South Africa, resting on the exploitation of labour power 
reproduced outside of the capitalist mode of production in the 
rural reserves, determined a colonial state form which would 
conserve pre-capitalist social relations in the rural reserves. 
This is a highly unsatisfactory account, for several reasons. As 
AP points out, it cannot explain the continuation of the colonial 
state form in the face of the accelerating economic and social 
'dissolution' of the rural bantustans. It incorrectly locates the 
major contradiction in South Africa as existing between 
capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production (AP: 78, 81). 
Nor can it account for the fact that social formations such as 
Kenya and Botswana exhibit similar economic relations between 
rural areas and capitalist enclaves, and yet could hardly be 
characterised as 'colonial' in state form. This points to the 
fundamental economism of Wolpe's argument.
AP tries to move beyond Wolpe's economism by utilising 
Althusser's theoretical conception of a principle determining 
contradiction and a dominant contradiction. AP argues that in 
South Africa, while the principle determining contradiction is 
that between capital and labour, the dominant contradiction is 
that between the "white colonial block" and the "black colonised 
majority" (ibid: 80). This is an important move beyond the
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monocausal determinism of Wolpe's argument. However, it is 
unsatisfactory because it does not succeed in specifying the 
relation between the two contradictions, nor on what basis the 
dominant contradiction is said to be dominant. AP describes the 
principle determining contradiction as relatively more abstract, 
since it is defined at the level of one instance only, ie the 
economy, although its effects reach throughout the social 
formation. The dominant contradiction on the other hand, which 
"designates the dominant line-up of social forces" is "relatively 
more concrete" since it "refers to the configuration of social 
forces across the social formation, and is not therefore 
abstracted from one specific instance." (ibid: 80)
The distinction between the two contradictions in terms of 
relative concreteness presumably could support a claim that 
racial oppression is closer to people's experience than is class 
exploitation and is therefore the correct contradiction to 
mobilise around. Gelb draws such a conclusion, as does Hudson 
( 1986: 27ff), and both proceed to demonstrate that this argument 
cannot be sustained. However, to make such a claim seems to me 
something of a dead end. Likewise, AP's theoretical approach is 
unsatisfactory because he/she does not explain the nature or 
origins of the dominant contradiction.
However, the theoretical picture changes radically if one follows 
Nolutshungu' s line of argument and locates the dominant 
contradiction at the level of the state and politics, ie it 
corresponds to Laclau's contradiction between the people and the 
powerblock. Then the claim that in terms of political strategy 
the dominant contradiction is that between the white colonial 
block and the black colonised block no longer rests on the claim 
that this contradiction is more concrete or that it is closer to 
subjective experience, but on the nature of this contradiction as 
the dominant political contradiction constituted by the state 
form and the relations of domination and subordination this 
entails. It is this that makes national liberation struggle the 
"historically appropriate" political strategy.
The question still remains though, as to what the relation 
between the class contradiction at the level of the economy, and 
the political contradiction at the level of the state, might be.
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Wolpe (1987), for example, points out - as does Gelb - that 
'pure' class does not exist - that class in South Africa is 
racially structured, or that racial categories are internal to 
class relations. The class contradiction is thus fractured and 
shaped by the political contradiction. The state, on the other 
hand, does not simply secure white' interests - it secures the 
interests of the capitalist class. Its structures and practices 
are, therefore, shaped in a fundamental way by class interests. 
For their part, nationalism and politics do not transcend class 
interests either, but, in the end, support the interests of one 
or other fundamental social class.
It is clear, therefore, that these two contradictions - and other 
secondary contradictions - are not isolated from each other, but 
act and react dialectically upon each other. This is a highly 
abstract and general statement. It seems reasonable to accept, 
however, that it is impossible to discover theoretically any 
determination more specific than this. The only way to uncover 
and analyse the relation between these two major - and other 
secondary - contradictions is through historical analysis of the 
concrete development of the social formation. It is impossible to 
arrive at a structural explanation for a particular state form, 
or for the content of ruling class or popular ideologies, or for 
the constitution of various social forces. The only possible 
explanation is an historical explanation that can capture the 
development of forces and structures in struggle.
Cutler et al ( 1978) put forward a formulation which 
conceptualises this point. They argue that for a particular form 
of economy to exist certain political, ideological, etc., 
conditions have to be met. These are the conditions of existence 
of that economy. Thus for example a capitalist economy 
presupposes certain political, ideological and legal conditions 
of existence; for instance, "a legal system with definite forms 
of property and contract". However, "these are abstract and 
general conditions"; "the concept of determinate relations of 
production does not tell us in what precise form those effects 
will be secured, nor does it tell us the precise character of the 
relations that secure them." (Cutler et al, 1978: 209) The 
actual way, then, that these conditions of existence are secured 
is a matter for historical, empirical investigation.
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5.4 The leadership of the working class
Although Laclau claims that popular democratic ideologies are 
necessarily articulated with class discourses and therefore 
cannot exist distinct from fundamental class forces, he does not 
demonstrate why this should be so. In his concrete analysis of 
Fascism in Germany he fails to show any concrete organisational 
link between the fascists and monopoly capital (Laclau, 1977: 
159). This connects with a deeper problem in his argument: 
classes are taken as pre-given forces, constituted by the 
relations of production, which are then able to engage in 
struggle for hegemony at the political-ideological level. Laclau 
argues that 'the people' and their popular democratic ideologies 
have to be articulated into a class force, but evades the 
question of how the working class comes to be constituted as a 
political force capable of articulating 'the people' and winning 
a leading position in popular democratic struggle (Nolutshungu's 
discussion suffers from similar flaws).
However, as I have argued above, classes are not already given as 
constituted social forces: they have to be organised and built, 
and there is a struggle over how they are to be constituted. 
Cutler et al allow us to conceive of a classless nationalist 
struggle, ie one in which the working class is not constituted as 
a political force, and in which the bourgeoisie is not detectably 
present. Such a struggle would be organised in opposition to the 
particular forms of domination in that society, ie national 
oppression. Thus it would constitute a direct challenge to the 
dominant political powers, particularly the state. Yet it would 
not challenge the conditions of existence of capitalism. In 
other words, it would challenge the particular political forms 
through which, historically, capitalism's conditions of existence 
have been secured in that country, yet it would not necessarily 
entail a challenge to capitalism as such. In the event of success 
new social groups might come to power, the state might be 
radically restructured, and it would entail a definite defeat for 
the social groups that had controlled the state; and yet it would 
continue to be a capitalist state maintaining the conditions of 
existence of a capitalist economy. It could be argued that such a
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form of nationalist struggle, is objectively in the interests of 
the bourgeoisie, although organised and led by the petty 
bourgeoisie.
For such a nationalist challenge to actually ensue in the end of 
capitalism and the construction of socialism, it would have to 
entail a fundamental challenge to the conditions of existence of 
capitalism as such. Such a challenge cannot be conceived of only 
at the level of ideological discourse (which is a definite 
weakness in Laclau’s discussion): it also has to be conceived of 
organisationally.
Since the domination of the working class in all these sites is 
the most critical condition for the continued existence of 
capitalism, a challenge to capitalism would necessarily entail 
organising and building the working cl&ss as a social and 
political force at all those sites where it is exploited, 
socially reproduced, oppressed and dominated. This means 
organising and engaging in struggles at the workplace, in the 
community, in schools, and more generally against an oppressive 
state. Since the working class needs powerful, resilient 
organisation with a depth of leadership and a mass base if it is 
to mount a serious challenge to capitalism, organisation at all 
these sites needs to be democratic and ensure mass participation 
and control. Such organisation is also in itself a challenge to 
the structures and practices of capitalist society, which are 
designed to rob ordinary people of power and control over their 
lives.
It is clear that FOSATU made a historical contribution to the 
development of the working class by building such organisation at 
one site of struggle, the point of production. This particular 
site is, again, critical for the challenge to capitalism, since 
it is the site of production and appropriation of social wealth.
Furthermore, such a challenge to capitalism would entail linking 
the various sites where the working class is organised, through a 
network of organisation, so that the working class becomes a 
powerful whole, a social force, able to combine the range of 
local, particular struggles into one overall struggle against a 
system of exploitation and oppression. Building the working class
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as a social force in this way gives it the capacity to exert 
leadership over a range of popular struggles, which is part of 
the process of building hegemony. If organisation is conceived of 
in this way, it entails organising, or stimulating the 
organisation of, not only workers, and not only the working class 
more broadly defined, but also other popular classes and strata, 
so that they coalesce around the organisations of the working 
class.
Some of the more populist unions that affiliated to the UDF took 
seriously the task of linking and combining struggles, but in the 
process tended to neglect building resilient, democratic 
organisation at the point of production. It is apparent that 
there is a tension between putting energy and resources into 
building shopfloor organisation, on the one hand, and helping to 
build community organisation and participating in political 
campaigns on the other. It is this tension that accounted for 
some of the differences between SFAWU militants and MAWU 
militants in FOSATU.
Finally, a challenge to capitalism would require that the working 
class take up the political issues and tasks of the day in 
relation to state power. In a country characterised by national 
oppression, it would require that the working class take up the 
national task of liberating the people. Working class 
organisations would have to become the main organising force 
within the nationalist struggle so as to become hegemonic. This 
would involve a range of organisations - trade unions, popular 
fronts located in the community, working class political 
organisations, etc.
It is in these various ways that the working class, defined by 
the primary contradiction in the economy, would become the 
leading force in the dominant political contradiction. Political 
victory would then pave the way for economic transformation.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has ranged far and wide in its attempt to 
understand the political changes that have taken place in the 
trade union movement between 1980 and 1986. It has ranged from an 
exploration of the experiences, struggles and ideas of a 
particular group of worker activists in Springs, through a 
general critical analysis of workerism in FOSATU, to a discussion 
of class reductionism, politics and the 'national question' in 
Marxism. At times the connection between the Springs case-study 
and the theoretical reflections may seem tenuous.
But my intention in the theoretical chapters has been twofold: 
firstly, to find the theoretical tools that will explain the 
experiences and struggles of the Springs workers and explain the 
rise to dominance of their political position in COSATU; and 
secondly, to use their experiences to help me elaborate the 
theoretical foundation of the political position which they hold, 
ie., the Congress position of the national liberation movement.
In terms of social analysis the implication of my line of 
argument is that the trade union as an analytical category has 
limited value in trying to explain the political consciousness 
and actions of workers. While there are certain similarities 
between trade unions in Britain, for example, and trade unions in 
South Africa (in terms of their collective bargaining functions), 
politically they are completely different, and this difference 
cannot be explained with reference to the different structures 
and practices in the trade unions, nor can it be explained simply 
in terms of the character of the primary contradiction, ie the 
different labour process, the different character of exploitation 
and economic crisis in the different countries. The difference
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can only be explained with reference to the historically specific 
nature of the political contradiction and political terrain. This 
means, too, that the sociological enterprise of comparing the 
'social movement unions' of Brazil, South Africa and Poland, 
while it captures the common element, ie. large scale mass 
production, can only provide limited insight if it leaves out of 
account the historical specificity of the 'national question' in 
each country. Thus the rise to dominance of the Congress position 
in the trade union movement, a development which the Springs 
case-study seeks to explore, cannot be explained without 
reference to the specifically political terrain on which the 
forces of national oppression and national liberation are 
organised.
In terms of political practice, the implication of my argument is 
that the trade union can only achieve its full political 
potential if it is part of an alliance: in the first place, an 
alliance of organisations located in different sites of struggle 
- precisely in order to grasp, deepen and link Althusser's 
"circumstances and currents", his "vast accumulation of 
contradictions"; and in the second place, a popular alliance of 
the different classes and strata that make up the oppressed 
people. The Springs case study clearly illustrates an attempt by 
organised workers to build this sort of alliance; in doing so 
they provide challenges to and insights for political theory in 
its attempt to understand the significance of their strategy.
The necessity for alliances can be illustrated with reference to 
civic associations. A civic association on its own is not an 
organ of popular power, since it is not part of a fundamental 
challenge to the relations of domination and subordination. It 
only develops into an organ of popular power once it is linked 
with a network of such organisations - amongst the youth , the 
unemployed and the women, at the workplace and in the schools, 
and once that network is perceived by the participants in it to 
be part of an overall challenge to the current social order as 
maintained by the state, ie as a struggle for the liberation of 
all the oppressed people.
The same applies to trade unions. While the struggle to establish 
trade unions in the face of intense repression appears to be -
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and is - in itself a political struggle and a political task, 
once the trade unions have established their right to exist and 
become part of an institutionalising of industrial conflict, 
their shop steward committees and shop steward councils cannot be 
considered to be organs of working class power in the 
transformational sense. They only become such organs when they 
are linked In with other organs of popular power as one component 
of a general struggle for power at all sites where the relations 
of domination deny power to the people. Thus the workers 
interviewed clearly perceived FOSATU as tending towards economism 
and avoiding politics for bread and butter issues - whatever the 
intentions of the workerist leadership may have been - precisely 
because it avoided alliances.
But for trade unions - and other popular organisations - to 
attain their full political potential the popular alliance of 
which they are part cannot restrict itself to localised sites of 
struggle around local grievances; it has to take on the political 
struggle which is determined by a terrain structured by 
historically specific political and ideological institutions and 
practices. In other words, the popular alliance, and the trade 
union movement as a component of it, has to organise itself as a 
liberation movement engaged in a national liberation struggle in 
all arenas - national, international, within the ruling block, as 
well as amongst the oppressed people. If liberation is to open up 
the possibility of a transition to socialism the working class 
has to become the leading force in the liberation movement. The 
working class can only win such a position if its organisations 
become the major organisational and ideological forces in 
building the movement, organising the necessary alliances and 
promising victory through their demonstrated power and militance.
Again, the case-study of Springs shows a group of working class 
leaders coming to this realisation and engaging in a struggle 
within the trade union movement to align it with the national 
liberation movement.
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